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Abstract:
This paper seeks to answer two questions: were the coinage debasements in Burgundian Flanders
(1384-1482) undertaken principally as monetary or fiscal policies; and were they beneficial or harmful?  In
a recent monograph, Sargent and Velde (Big Problem of Small Change: 2002) contend that monetary
objectives governed almost all medieval, early-modern debasements, especially to remedy the chronic
shortages of petty coins.  Despite overwhelming evidence that Burgundian Flanders, along with most of
north-west Europe in the later 14
th and 15
th centuries, experienced severe monetary scarcities and liquidity
crises, especially in the periods ca.  1390  - ca.  1415 and ca.  1440 - ca.  1470, both periods of severe
deflations, eras commonly known as ‘bullion famines’, there is no compelling evidence that the Burgundian
rulers debased their coinages on the basis of any such monetary policies.  My thesis is that the Burgundian
rulers of Flanders, in competition with neighboring princes, undertook their debasements primarily as
aggressive fiscal policies, specifically to finance warfare.  Their goal was to increase their seigniorage
revenues, the tax imposed on bullion brought to their mints, by two means: by increasing the tax rate itself,
and by enticing an increased influx of bullion into their mints, both by the debasement techniques themselves
and by auxiliary bullionist policies.  Those policies were successful so long as three conditions were met: (1)
that merchants supplying bullion received more coins of the same face value and thus with a greater aggregate
money-of-account value than before (or than from other mints); (2) that the public accepted such debased
coins at the same face value, by tale; and (3) that the merchants spent their increased supply of coins quickly,
before any ensuing inflation eroded those gains.  This study further demonstrates that the inflationary
consequences of debasements were always less than those predicted by mathematical formulae – possibly
because those debasements failed to counteract the prevailing forces of monetary contraction and deflation.
Because so many princes pursued similar fiscal policies, many others engaged in debasement for purely
defensive reasons: to protect their mints from foreign competition and to protect their domestic money
supplies from influxes of debased and also counterfeit imitations: i.e., to counteract Gresham’s Law.  If many
debasements were retaliatory measures against a neighbour’s bullionist policies, those policies in general, and
not just debasements, were also products of late-medieval warfare, which was also the primary culprit
responsible for periodic monetary contractions: by impeding coinage circulations and bullion flows, and by
provoking increased hoarding.  The answer to the final question is that debasements were usually far more
harmful than beneficial.
Note that this is an extensively revised and shortened version of an earlier working paper (no.  355),
correcting some errors in that paper (concerning Spanish coinage): with the same tables, but with a new set
of graphs,
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2  Johnson, Nicholas Oresme.  The tract is also known as De Moneta.   No original manuscript exists,
and its exact date of composition remains unknown.  See also, On Oresme, see also Spufford,  Money and
Its Use,  pp.  295-304; and  Bridrey, Théorie de la monnaie; and below, p.  14.
Coinage and Monetary Policies in Burgundian Flanders
during the Late-Medieval ‘Bullion Famines’, 1384 - 1482
********************************************
Introduction: coinage debasements in late-medieval Europe
Monetary policies dedicated to coinage debasements produced one of the most prominent,
widespread, and arguably most harmful features of the later-medieval and early modern European  economies.
  Though certainly many rulers in the ancient and early medieval worlds had also practised coinage
debasements, King Philip IV of France (r.  1285-1313) was the  first to undertake them  this era, in 1295.
1
The subsequent  Burgundian rulers of the French royal fief of Flanders (1384-1482)  were among the most
active and avid practitioners of this ‘dark art.’  Debasement was a policy that the eminent French philosopher,
Nicolas Oresme, Bishop of Lisieux, chaplain,  and counsellor of King Charles V (r.  1364-1380), had
thoroughly condemned  – unless undertaken with pubic approval – on the very eve of the Burgundian era,
in his famous Treatise on Coins (De origine, natura, jure et mutationibus monetarum).
2 The first duke of
Burgundy, Philip the Bold (r. 1384-1404), son of King John II of France, and younger brother of King
Charles VI (r.  1380-1422), was certainly well aware of Oresme’s strong views on debasements.
Nevertheless, the rationale, nature, forms, and consequences, economic and social, of medieval and
early modern coinage debasements remain very contentious issues, in an ongoing vexatious debate.  The
central issues to be resolved are two-fold.  First, were coinage debasement pursued principally as monetary
policies or as fiscal policies?  Second, whatever their rationale, were the consequences beneficial or harmful
to the economies and societies of this era? 
Recently,  two very eminent economists, Thomas Sargent and François Velde, in a much praised
monograph on The Big Problem of Small Change (2002), have set forth a compelling view, substantially2
3  Sargent and Velde, Big Problem of Small Change.
4  For this debate, see Munro, Bullion Flows; Munro, ‘Wage-Stickiness’, pp. 185 - 297; Miskimin,
Early Renaissance Europe, pp.  25-32, 132-50;  Miskimin, ‘Money and Money Movements’, pp.  79-96; Day,
The Medieval Market Economy; Spufford, Money and Its Use, pp. 339-62; and sources cited in n.1.
5  Until 1172, when Genoa struck for the first grossi, the largest coin denomination struck in western
Europe was, in fact, the silver penny.  The  weight of the Carolinian pound was 489.6 grams: according to
Fournial, Histoire monétaire, pp.  24-27, whose arguments justifying this weight are quite complex. But this
weight has been challenged by other numismatists (by even more complex arguments), who variously offer
alternative weights: 408.0 g., 411.36, 459.36, and 483.33. The last is based on the supposition that the Roman
pound in fact weighed 322.2 , and that the Carolingian pound was 1.5 times heavier. For the other weights,
different from Oresme’s hostile verdict.
3  They contend that most medieval and early modern coinage
debasements were rational and public-spirited monetary policies undertaken to remedy periodic coin
shortages, but especially the chronic, pervasive shortage of ‘small change’, or petty coins.  Generally fractions
of a penny, containing far more copper than silver (except in England), these were the coins that the poor,
most of the peasantry and  labouring classes, and indeed the substantial majority of the population required
to purchase food, drink, and other basic necessities.  Many other historians had set forth somewhat similar
views contending that such debasements were a necessary remedy for the periodic deflationary ‘bullion
famines’ that had afflicted so much of western Europe, especially north-western Europe,  during the later
fourteenth and through much of the fifteenth centuries.
4
Medieval coinages, moneys of account, and debasements
Whatever the rationale for late-medieval coinage debasements, any answers to questions about their
possible roles as monetary or fiscal policies must begin with an examination of the technology of minting and
coinage alterations, which in turn requires a firm understanding of the relationship between coined money
and moneys-of-account.   The money-of-account system of Burgundian Flanders, the pond groot Flemish,
and the prevailing systems  used in medieval and early modern western Europe, were all based on one devised
by Charlemagne’s government, ca.  790-802: in which one pound weight of fine silver was then valued at one
libra or pound of money of account, consisting of 20 shillings, each of which contained 12 pence (d), so that
one pound = 240d.
5  One pence (d) in money-of-account was always equal or tied to the currently circulating3
see Blockmans, ‘Le poids des deniers carolingiens’, pp.  179-81. None of these critics, however, explains the
origin or evolution of the Parisian pound of 489.506 grams; nor explain why its weight, readily verifiable
from the surviving official metallic weights, was virtually identical to that ascribed to the Carolingian pound
by Fournial.
6 In France and the Low Countries, the fineness of silver coins was reckoned, in terms of
commercially fine silver, known as argent le roy, which was 23/24 or 95.833% pure, with 4.167% copper
alloy.  Argent-le-roy was reckoned in terms of 12 deniers, each of which contained 24 grains; and thus 288
grains in total. The fineness of gold coins was reckoned everywhere in terms of carats: so that fine gold coins
had 24 carats (which, however, were probably 23.875 carats = 99.479% pure gold, with 0.53% copper: the
actual fineness of Florentine florins, Venetian ducats, and English nobles).  Gold coins  were commonly
alloyed with both silver and copper.  Thus the Burgundian gold florin, from 1466, contained 19 carats of gold,
4 carats of silver, and only 1 carat of copper.
7 The mint-weight used in France and the Low Countries was the marc de Troyes = one half of the
French pound or livre de Paris = 244.7529 grams (see n.  5 above).  The marc contained 8 onces, each of
which contained 24  deniers, each of which in turn contained 24 grains, for a total of 4608 grains to the marc.
The medieval English mint weight was the Tower Pound, with 12 ounces: each containing 20 dwt (penny-
weight), each of  which contains 32 grains, for a total of 7680 grains = 5400 Troy grains = 11.25 Troy ounces
= 349.9144 grams.  In 1525, it was superseded by the Troy pound, also of 12 ounces, with 20 dwt to the
ounce and 24 grains to the dwt, for a total of 5760 grains = 373.242 grams.  See Munro, ‘Medieval Monetary
Metrology’,  pp.  173-99; and Munro, ‘Age of Erasmus’, pp. 311-48. 
silver penny, whatever its current fineness and weight. 
In the simplest terms, a physical debasement means the reduction of the quantity of precious metal
– silver or gold –  contained in the currently circulating coins, of a given face value, and thus also in the
related unit of money-of-account: e.g., the penny, the shilling, and the pound.  Such physical reductions in
the precious metal of the coin itself  took place by either a reduction in the weight of the coin itself; or by a
diminution in its precious metal fineness:  i.e., by adding proportionately more base metal — usually copper;
or, most commonly, by both methods combined.
6  The consequence was to increase the number of coins with
a given face value – e.g., the penny, or the shilling – minted from a pound or marc weight (244.753 g) of
commercially fine silver.
7 That meant as well a corresponding increase in the nominal money-of-account
value of that pound or marc of silver, known as the traite, as may be seen in Tables 1A and 1B, below.
Another form of coinage debasement, which normally applied only to gold coins and to more full-
bodied, high-valued silver coins, was to increase their official exchange rates, or nominal money-of-account
values.   It must be clearly understood that gold values, and thus exchange rates, were always expressed in4
8 The same set of changes were also required for full-bodied, high-value silver coins, if they were left
unchanged during a debasement of lower-value coins.  See Table 1B.
9  The modern English term billon is commonly defined as a base or petty coin, one in which silver
constitutes less than half of the metallic content, and thus copper (base metal) accounts for over half.  The
medieval term – billon, billoen, billio – meant instead bullion: any precious metal, including demonetized
coinage, domestic and foreign, that was legally required to be surrendered to the prince’s mint for coinage.
It excluded precious metals in jewellery, plate, objets d’art,  dress, and raw materials legitimately acquired
by jewellers and goldsmiths, etc., for their crafts.  See Munro, ‘Billon’, pp.  293-305.
terms of the principality’s silver-based money-of -account.  Such increases in official coinage values were
necessary to maintain the former value relationships of these high-valued coins, if they were not similarly
debased in fineness and/or weight,  with the debased silver penny and other fractional coins. 
That can be best understood by relating the market values of gold and silver coins, when, in this era,
the normal ratio of values was about 11:1 or 12:1.  A debasement of just one of the two coinages – say, the
silver coinage –  would have altered the bimetallic mint ratio to favour silver and thus to ‘disfavour’ gold,
simply because that debasement would have increased the relative money-of-account value of the new silver
coins.   To some extent a small change in the bimetallic ratio may have been undertaken indeed to favour one
of the two metals, and thus to encourage a greater influx of that metal into the prince’s mint.  But too drastic
an alteration of the mint-ratio in favour of one metal (e.g., silver) would have led to the outflow of the other
metal (gold). To prevent that exodus, the prince had to raise the official exchange rate or money-of-account
value of the gold coins, or to debase the gold coins as well, by the physical means just discussed.
8
The reasons why monetary transactions were almost invariably conducted in coin, even debased coin,
rather than in bullion (or ingots), is fundamental to comprehending the nature and rational for debasements
in medieval and early modern Europe.   First, it was almost everywhere  illegal to trade, or to make
transactions, in bullion.  For the law in most medieval principalities stipulated that all precious metals deemed
to be bullion  (billon) – excluding metals for licenced goldsmiths – had to be surrendered to the prince’s mint
for coinage.
9   But second, even if it had been legal to make transactions in bullion, doing so would not have
been economically feasible, in terms of the required transaction costs: i.e., the cost of weighing the bullion,5
10 For the economics of these mintage fees – brassage and seigniorage – see below, pp.  23-25.
11   For reasons why coins would lose that agio, see below, pp.  12-13.
and assaying it for fineness, and determining its market or exchange value.  Gold and silver coins were
generally worth  more than their intrinsic bullion costs simply because they were a fully recognized legal
tender – with the ruler’s stamp of authorization or approval.
Official, legal tender coins were thus a cost-saving medium of exchange.  That savings on transaction
costs constituted an agio or premium that legal tender coins thereby commanded over their intrinsic bullion
values. Merchants paid for that premium in their mintage fees, which were deducted from the total value of
the coins produced from their bullion.
10   So long as this agio that coins thereby commanded over bullion  was
at least equal to the sum of the mintage fees, merchants would have continued to deliver bullion to the mints.
Conversely,  whenever domestic coins lost that agio, merchants would no longer have delivered bullion to
the prince’s mint, and would most likely have either hoarded or exported that bullion to some foreign mint.
11
Usually those precious metals so exported were sold to some foreign prince’s mint as bullion and converted
into his debased coins, provided that the aggregate value of those coins, so converted from the bullion,
commanded a higher purchasing power there, than in the country from which the original coins (or bullion)
had been exported.
The objectives of any coinage debasement – whether undertaken by fineness, weight, or value, or
some combination thereof – were two-fold.  The first was to increase the number of coins, of any given coin
denomination, struck from a pound weight  or marc of fine metal delivered to the mint, and thus to increase
the aggregate money-of-account value of the total coinage struck from bullion so delivered (the traite value).
Such increases in both the number and the money-of-account values of coins so struck can also be seen in
Tables 1A and 1B.  The second objective was to induce a much greater influx of precious metals into the
prince’s mint,  from both domestic and foreign bullion, including demonetized  coins (collectively  known6
12  See n.  9 above.
13   For such views, which I no longer endorse, see Munro, Wool, Cloth and Gold.
14  Munro, ‘Mint Policies’, pp. 71-116;  Munro, ‘Bullion Flows’, pp. 97-158;  Munro, ‘Mint Outputs’,
pp. 31-122;  Munro, ‘Monnayage’, pp. 263-94; Munro, ‘Petty Coinage’, pp. 387-423;  Munro,  Bullion
Flows; Munro, ‘Wage-Stickiness’, pp. 185 - 297;  Munro, ‘Monetary Origins.’  pp. 1-34;  Munro, ‘Black
Death, ‘ pp. 335-364.
15  Munro, ‘Petty Coinage’,  pp. 387-423: in particular Table 3, p.  396.
as billon).
12   
Burgundian coinage debasements as monetary policies: the debate about the late-medieval ‘bullion
famines’, deflation,  and their resolution
This analysis of the mechanics and economics of medieval coinage debasements certainly seems to
provide good prima facie grounds for contending that they were indeed undertaken as monetary policies
specifically to remedy period coinage scarcities, during the well known ‘bullion famines’ of late-medieval
western Europe.  Earlier in my academic career, I had cavalierly dismissed any notions of so-called ‘bullion
famines’ or any general problems of monetary scarcities, contending that inadequate supplies of bullion
delivered to a prince’s mint constituted a situation very different from any general scarcity of coinage in any
regional economy, and had to be explained by deficient mint policies.
13  
Since then, however, my subsequent research convinced me that much of western Europe, and most
especially the Low Countries and England, had indeed experienced severe monetary scarcities, if not
precisely full-fledged ‘bullion famines’, with attendant problems of severe deflation, especially in two
periods: from ca.  1375 to ca.  1415; and from ca.  1440 to ca.  1470.
14  Furthermore, my research on
Burgundian monetary history had also convinced me that there were indeed very good prima facie grounds
for contending that the late-medieval Low Countries had experienced a chronic shortage of petty coins: for
the Burgundian mint accounts show that rarely was more than one per cent of the bullion received minted into
these petty coins, known as monnaies noires, because they were largely copper.
15
The evidence for and reflection of such monetary scarcities can be found in the drastic declines in7
16  Munro, ‘Central European Mining Boom’, pp. 119 - 83; Munro, ‘Monetary Origins’,  pp. 1-34.
17  Munro’,Profit Inflation’, pp. 13-71; Hamilton,  Price Revolution.
18  See Munro, ‘Bullionism and the Bill of Exchange’,  pp. 169-239; Munro, ‘Patterns of Trade’, pp.
147-95; Munro, ‘Financial Innovations’, pp. 105-67; Munro, ‘Wage-Stickiness’, pp. 185 - 297.
mint outputs – often verging on a complete cessation of new coinages – and of deflations that were clearly
products of those coinage scarcities in north-western Europe.  Several of my publications since then have
been devoted to this theme, in particular to demonstrate the seriously negative economic consequences of
deflation: i.e., of a serious, continuous, sustained fall in the price level.  I also contended that the late-
medieval ‘bullion-famine’ era had come to an end in the 1470s, after low commodity prices (i.e., deflation)
had provided the economic motivation or profit incentive – by increasing the purchasing power of silver –
for the two technological innovations that resolved this monetary problem.  Those innovations,  in both civil
engineering (water-pumps) and chemical engineering (the Seigerhütten process), made possible the South
German silver-copper mining boom, which in turn quintupled Europe’s supply of mined silver, from the
1460s to the 1540s (though much was exported).
16   From the 1540s, Europe began receiving even larger
influxes of silver, from the new Spanish American colonies.
17
Coinage debasements had certainly never played any effective role in combatting late-medieval
monetary scarcities and deflation; nor had any reputed advances in late-medieval banking and finance.
18  Nor
have I ever been able to find any evidence, in the vast documentation now available for Burgundian Flanders,
that its rulers had ever undertaken coinage debasements as monetary policies specifically to pursue any such
reflationary objectives, with one minor, indeed trivial exception.
On  31 August 1457,  during the worst phase of the mid-century bullion ‘famine’, the Burgundian
monetary authorities  instructed the Bruges mint-master to strike a greater number of monnaies noires called
courtes or double-mites (= 1/12th of a penny groot) from the alloyed marc:  240 per marc instead of the
previously stipulated number (or taille),  216.  The results were not impressive: in the quinquennium 1456-60,
only 51.302 kg of fine silver were minted – compared to 112 times as much in 1426-30: 5,724.645 kg.  On8
19  These courtes had a fineness of 12 grains silver = 4.17% argent le roy.  See Deschamps de Pas,
‘Histoire monétaire des comtes de Flandre’, pp. 123-24; and  Munro, ‘Petty Coinage’,  pp. 387-423: in
particular Table 3, p.  396.  This exception is nowhere mentioned in Sargent and Velde, Big Problem of Small
Change.
20  See Munro, Wool, Cloth and Gold, pp.  11-41;  Munro, ‘Bullionism and the Bill of Exchange’,
pp. 169-239;  Munro, ‘Bullion Flows and Monetary Contraction’,  pp. 97-158.  Medieval and early-modern
England was an exception.   From 1364 to 1663, Parliament banned the export of all English legal tender
coins. Statute 38 Edwardi III stat 1 c. 2 (Jan. 1364), in Statutes of the Realm, vol. I, p. 383, and Rymer,
Foedera, vol. III.ii, p. 728; Statute  15 Carolus II c. 7 (May 1663), in Statutes of the Realm, vol. V, p. 452,
sec. 9.  See also Munro, ‘Bullionism and the Bill of Exchange’, pp. 187-205, 216-39.
the other hand, 11.4 per cent of the fine silver struck the Flemish mints in the later 1450s (none from Oct 1458
to June 1466) was coined into mites – and that percentage may be compared to a typical percentage, as
previously noted,  of about one per cent, during the rest of the Burgundian era.
19
Late-medieval ‘bullionism’ and defensive motives for coinage debasements
Although late-medieval mint and monetary policies in north-western Europe were otherwise unrelated
to current problems of monetary scarcities and deflation, they must be understood in the context of this era’s
bullionist philosophies.  The term ‘bullionism’  – providing the medieval roots of early-modern Mercantilism
– refers to all those government policies and measures designed to increase the influx of precious metals into
the ruler’s lands, and more specifically, into his mints, and also related policies designed to prevent the export
of precious metals, except legal-tender coins.
20  Late-medieval bullionist policies may be attributed not just
to the princes’ mint-profit motives, but also to the strong, almost universal  conviction that the wealth,
prosperity, and power of a realm fundamentally depended upon its stock of precious metals.   T h o s e
bullionist policies obviously also became an integral feature of medieval mint policies: especially those
designed  both to protect the realm against foreign debasements and to permit the prince to engage in
defensive coinage debasements.  Thus, if the monetary policies practised by so many late-medieval princes
may be viewed as aggressive, their victims would have been not only their own subjects but also those in
neighbouring principalities.  As in any form of warfare, victims of these late-medieval guerres monétaires
would have instinctively sought to defend themselves; and if the best defence is offence, then many princes9
21  See n.  9, above.
22  See Munro, ‘Gresham’s Law’, pp. 480-81; Munro, Wool, Cloth and Gold, pp.  11-41; and nn.  63,
70 below.  This law is attributed to Sir Thomas Gresham (1519-1579), a merchant-banker and royal agent
in Antwerp, and financial advisor to Queen Elizabeth I; he was also the founder of the Royal Exchange, in
London (1565; on 23 January 1571, Elizabeth bestowed its royal title).  But he did not formulate the law as
such, and it was well known centuries before.
23   Spufford,   Money and Its Use, p.  347:  ‘Fear of debasements, and the instability of money, made
men happier to keep their silver in the form of plate, in addition to the desire for ostentation.’
24  See n.  22, above.
did so by engaging in retaliatory debasements and related bullionist measures. 
    In pursuing debasements and related bullionist policies, the Burgundian dukes, along with most
medieval princes, banned not only the export of precious metals but also the importation of foreign coins,
especially silver coins.  Such foreign coins, so demonetized (denied the status of legal tender), were declared
or deemed to be  bullion (billon) and thus had to be surrendered as such to the prince’s mints.
21  What these
rulers clearly perceived, correctly, was the operation of what is called Gresham’s Law: in essence, that cheap
money – i.e., debased or counterfeit and thus bad money  – drives out dearer coins: i.e., better-quality, higher-
silver or higher-gold content coins.
22
Though without specific references to Gresham’s Law, Peter Spufford has contended that periodic
coinage debasements, instead of alleviating coin scarcities, acted only to exacerbate hoarding, with attendant
negative consequences for the European medieval economy.
23   Gresham’s Law assumes that the good coin
that is driven out by the influx of foreign debased coins or by the circulation of domestic debased coins  is
either buried, converted into plate, or exported. 
24 Indeed, with continuous competitive medieval debasements,
much coin and bullion were exported to gain a higher value from foreign mints engaged in aggressive
debasements.  One can also readily appreciate that virtually all late-medieval bullionist policies must be
blamed, along with warfare, and its consequences, for seriously impeding and diminishing the circulation of
precious metals in the European economy.  As I have contended elsewhere, late-medieval monetary
contractions, or the periodic ‘bullion famines’ were more the consequence of reduced monetary flows than10
25  See Munro,  Bullion Flows;  Munro, ‘Patterns of Trade’, pp. 147-95;  Munro, ‘Wage-Stickiness’,
pp. 185 - 297.
26  See Patterson, ‘Silver Stocks’, pp.  205-35;  Mayhew, ‘Numismatic Evidence’, pp. 1-15;
Feavearyear, Pound Sterling, pp.  1-45.  He argues that most English debasements, before those of Henry
VIII, were undertaken for such defensive reasons; but medieval England was a monetary anomaly.
27  For the concept of coinage agio, or its premium in value over bullion, see above, pp.  8, 12.
28  On this, see Feavearyear, Pound Sterling, pp.  1-45. 
of reduced monetary stocks – including supposed outflows of bullion in trade with the East.
25
Clearly, therefore, a very common motive for late-medieval debasements was purely defensive: to
protect a prince’s realm, and his own mints, obviously, from the economic as well as purely monetary
damages inflicted by an influx of foreign debased coins.  That was all the more serious a problem when those
foreign influxes contained fraudulent or counterfeit imitation of that prince’s own coins, and thus containing
of course a smaller precious metal content.  An allied problem was the circulation of coins, domestic and
foreign, that had been fraudulently clipped or otherwise denuded of their precious metal contents.  
The same consequences, however,  could also have been  honestly produced by simple wear and tear
of the coins over time, since both silver and gold were very soft metals, even when alloyed with copper (as
a necessary hardening agent). 
26  When such clipping, wear and tear, or other diminutions in the precious-
metal contents of so many coins in current circulation had led to the market’s elimination of the  agio or
premium that coins commanded over bullion,  then, as noted earlier,  bullion ceased to flow to the prince’s
mints.
27  That would have forced the prince to engage in a debasement that reduced the silver contents of the
penny and related coins to the level of the silver found in the currently circulating coinage.  Such a
debasement would have restored the agio of coinage over bullion, and thereby would also have renewed an
influx of bullion into the prince’s mints. 
28
Burgundian coinage debasements: aggressive motives for fiscal policies to finance warfare.
Almost all late-medieval mint ordinances – certainly those in France and the Low Countries – include
virtual renditions of Gresham Law, and citations of these very adverse circumstances, in order to justify the11
29  See Munro, Wool, Cloth and Gold, pp.  28, 33, 35 n.  24, 40, 44 n.6, 49, 58 n.  54, 60, 74 n.  33,
87 n.  58, 101 n.  20, 150 n.  76, 161 n.  19, 169.
30  Feavearyear, Pound Sterling, pp.  15-45; Munro, Wool, Cloth and Gold, chapters 1-6.
31  From Investopedia, via Answers.com: ‘Seigniorage may be counted as revenue for a government
when the money that is created is worth more than it costs to produce it. This revenue is often used by
governments to finance a portion of their expenditures without having to collect taxes. If, for example, it costs
the U.S. government $0.05 to produce a $1 bill, the seigniorage is $0.95, or the difference between the two
amounts.’
prince’s coinage debasements.
29  Obviously it was always better to appear to be the victim than the victimizer.
Only in England, however, and there, only in 1351 and 1411, can coinage debasements be judged to have
been purely defensive; the next one (also fifty years later), Edward IV’s debasement of 1464, was only partly
defensive and certainly much more so aggressive.
30    Virtually all debasements in late-medieval France and
the Low Countries – where the evidence can be weighed carefully – even when retaliatory in nature, were
essentially aggressive in nature. 
In brief, the fundamental aggressive motive to explain so many late-medieval coinage debasements
was a lust for mint profits.  That concept  may be difficult to understand in today’s world; but, in medieval
and early-modern Europe, mints were indeed operated with a goal of producing profits.  Even so, in today’s
world, the term seigniorage is still used for the same purpose: to indicate a source of government revenue
from printing money.
31  In medieval and early-modern Europe, those profits came from the  revenues that
almost (if not all) governments of this era earned by virtue – so to speak – of their rigid monopoly on coinage
in their own principalities.  
  If, however, the primary motive for most aggressive debasements was such profit-seeking, we may
ask what lay behind that princely demand for seigniorage revenues?   In my view, the rationale for such
debasements, and from the prince’s point of view, the real justification, was the need for readily available and
elastic revenues to finance  both warfare and defence.  One must understand that medieval princes were rarely
able to increase their feudal taxes in the short run;  and that securing additional incomes from taxes, aides,
loans, or grants from town assemblies, estates, or other legislative assemblies was difficult and usually12
32   In England, after Edward III’s  very minor, defensive debasement in 1351, the 1352 Parliament,
by its Statute of Purveyors, decreed that the coinage ‘shall never be worsened, neither in weight nor in
fineness (aloi)’, without its consent.  The crown did observe that parliamentary statute for over a century –
until Edward IV’s debasement of 1464.  Statutes of the Realm, vol.  I, p.  322: Stat.  25 Edwardi III, stat.  5,
c.  13.  See Munro, Wool, Cloth, and Gold, pp.  35, 159-63 See below for Flanders, in 1418 and 1433, on pp.
28-29; and  Spufford,  ‘Coinage, Taxation, and the Estates General’, pp. 63-88; Spufford, Monetary Problems
and Policies, pp.  1-46.
33  Hans Van Werveke, ‘Economische en sociale gevolgen’, pp. 1 - 15;Van Werveke, ‘‘Currency
Manipulation’, pp. 115-127.
34  Johnson, Nicholas Oresme, p.  24: ‘Videtur michi quod principalis et finalis causa propter quam
princeps sibi vult assumere potestatem mutandi monetas, est emolumentum vel lucrum quod inde potest
habere; aliter enim frustra faceret tot mutanciones et tantas.’
involved unwelcome concessions.  
The mint and the coinage, however, were the prince’s exclusive  prerogative, though even that
prerogative was sometimes challenged.
32   Often late-medieval mints did  produce very large seigniorage
revenues, as Hans Van Werveke has demonstrated, for example, for the reign of Flanders’ Count Louis de
Male (r. 1346-84).
33  Few would doubt that such fiscal motives had a strong priority in the coinage
debasements of Philip IV and all of his royal successors in fourteenth- and fifteenth-century France.  Certainly
the aforementioned French philosopher and royal advisor Nicholas Oresme had no such doubts, in stating in
his treatise De Moneta, ca.  1355, that:
34
I am of the opinion that the main and final cause why the prince pretends to the power of
altering the coinage is the profit or gain that he can get from it; [for] it would otherwise be
vain to make so many and so great changes.
The mechanics and economics of profit-seeking coinage debasements
Both the mechanics and economics of debasement as a fiscal policy to earn seigniorage revenues can
be seen clearly in Table 5. It compares the coinage of the Flemish double groot coin, as struck from  June
1418 to October 1428, with the new, debased coinage of November 1428.  The official exchange value of this
coin remained 2d  groot, but its pure silver content had been reduced from 1.725 grams to 1.522 grams, for
a loss of 0.203 g. or  11.768 per cent of its former (1418) fine silver contents.  That diminution in silver
contents had been achieved by reducing both the fineness and the weight of the double groot: the former,13
35 For definitions of the monetary terms, see nn.  5-6, above.  Note that the number of double groot
coins struck from that marc in November  1428, namely 154.125, is 13.33 per cent greater than the 136
double groot coins struck from the same marc from June 1418 to October 1428: i.e., a difference of 18.125
double groot coins = 36.25d or 3s 0d 6 mites.  Note also that this difference in the total number of coins
struck from the fine silver  marc exactly equals the difference between the two traite values for the marc: 25s
8d 6 mites by the November 1428 mint indenture, compared to a sum of  22s 8d, for the previous coinage,
of June 1418. This relationship between debasement and the increase in traite values is in accordance with
the  ΔT (traite) = [1/(1 - x)] - 1, relating changes involving reciprocals.  Its importance is discussed below,
on pp.  19-20.
from 47.92 per cent purity (6 deniers argent le roy) to 42.59 per cent purity (5 deniers 8 grains); the latter,
from a weight of 1.800 grams (68 cut to the marc de Troyes) to 1.588 gr (68.5 to the marc).  The number of
double groot coins cut from a marc de Troyes of commercially fine silver (argent-le-roy) rose from 136
double groot coins to 154.125 coins; and thus the change in traite or money-of-account value of that marc
rose from 22s 8d (i.e., 136 x 2d) to 25s 8d 6 mites.   The reduction in the coin’s silver content, by 11.77 per
cent, resulted in a 13.33 per cent increase in the value of the traite per marc de Troyes of commercially fine
silver.
35  The results can be seen in Table 6.
The merchants’ gains from late-medieval coinage debasements
For any debasement to succeed, and  to induce a much larger influx of bullion into the prince’s mints,
the mint had to offer merchants who delivered bullion a real gain, or a better price than that offered by any
competing mints, for their bullion (including previous and demonetized domestic coin issues).  The
merchants’ actual gains depended on the fulfillment of three conditions.  The first was that the merchants had
to receive  a greater number of coins, with the same face value, than they had previously received, and a
higher value, in terms of goods and gold, than they would have received from any other mint.  The second
was that the public, including other merchants, had to accept the newly debased coins at the same nominal
or face value, by tale (discussed below).  The third condition was that these new coins had to retain their
purchasing power, at least in terms of good and services within the domestic economy, within the ‘short run’
– in time for the merchants to spend their new coins.
In Table 5,  compare the number and the money-of-account values of the double groot coins that14
36  See Rolnick and Weber, ‘Gresham’s Law’, pp. 185-99; and Rolnick, Velde, and Weber, ‘The
Debasement Puzzle’, pp.  789-808; and Sargent and Smith, ‘Coinage Debasements and Gresham’s Laws’,
pp. 197 - 226; and Velde, Weber, and Wright, ‘ Model of Commodity Money’, pp.  291-333.  A much more
nuanced, highly modified view appears in Sargent and Velde, ‘Big Problem of Small Change’, pp. 137-61;
and especially in the more recent Sargent and Velde, Big Problem of Small Change (2002).  See an attack on
their earlier views in Selgin, ‘Salvaging Gresham’s Law’, pp.  637-49.  For even earlier views, influencing
Rolnick and Weber, see Miskimin, ‘Enforcement of Gresham’s Law’, pp.  147-61; and Miskimin, ‘Legal
Tender’, pp.  697-705.   For my own views, see Munro, ‘Gresham’s Law’, pp. 480-81.
37  See above, pp.  8-9.
merchants received for their bullion in June 1418 with those received after the debasement of November
1428.  We thus  find that merchants received, per marc of commercially fine silver, the following:  in June
1418, 127 double groot coins worth 21s 2d groot (93.38 per cent of the bullion delivered); and in November
1428, 144 double groot coins, now worth 24s 0d groot (93.43 per cent of the bullion delivered).  Their purely
nominal gain of the extra 17 coins or (34d: or 2s 10d groot) was 13.38 per cent.  Thus the mint ordinance
fulfilled the first of our conditions.
The second condition is the most complex of the three: why would the public have accepted these
newly debased  coins at face value, when they contained less fine silver than before?  This is a very important
question because several economists have recently  put forward two contrary propositions, to prove, in effect,
that medieval debasements could  not have worked  – despite the evidence that debasements were so
commonly practised, and for several centuries.  The critics’s first argument is that  the general populace
would not have accepted such newly debased coins at face value, but only at a proportionally lesser or
discounted value: i.e., discounted from the amount of silver contained in the immediately  preceding coin
issue.  Such discounting would have thus denied those merchants who converted bullion into debased coins
any real gains. In effect, these critics are contending that Gresham’s Law did not apply to medieval coinages,
and it is therefore a modern fallacy.
36 In part that view can be rejected on the various grounds cited earlier
to explain why domestic commerce was always transacted in legal tender coins rather than in bullion.
37
Medieval hammered coinages: problems of detecting changes in weight and fineness
But an even more compelling argument to explain the general acceptance of even debased legal15
tender coins, at face value,  can be found in the technology of medieval mints:  for what is known as
‘hammered’  coinages   In striking silver coins, from thin alloyed sheets of metal, with the required
proportions of silver and copper, the mint-master’s employees first cut out circular disks, known as blanks.
The mint-master himself (or his trained deputy) then placed each of these blanks on the anvil-like lower coin
dye.  He  then used a hammer to strike the upper coin-dye placed above the blank, thereby implanting the
obverse and reverse stamps, with appropriate symbols or emblems of the prince,  on each side of the coin.
The employees then used shears to trim the disks, which had been flattened and extended by this hammering,
into approximately round disks.  As a consequence, coins so struck were never exactly the same in size,
shape, and weight.  Indeed coin weights were never specified by any measure other than the taille: i.e., the
number cut from the alloyed marc, with a tolerance or remède of the number of coins (plus or minus),
permitted to be struck from each marc. 
Thus most  individuals handling separate and individual coins were never able to tell whether not any
differences between the weights of coins of a given denomination were purely the accidental results of these
techniques or the result of fraud, including counterfeiting.  Note,  from a comparison of the two mint
indentures, that the very minute changes  in weight would have been very difficult to detect, even for those
very few money specialists, usually just money-changers and bankers, who were equipped with accurate
scales.  They in turn might have required sets of perhaps fifty or one hundred coins to detect differences on
these scales.  Needless to say, most retail merchants, let alone individual customers, would not have been so
equipped to undertake such tests.
Detecting changes in the coin’s fineness was even more difficult, especially when the changes were
as small as those indicated in Table 5, for the November 1428 Flemish debasement.   Again, only money-
changers and bankers would likely have been equipped with the required device for such testing, known as
touchstones:   instruments on which coins were rubbed to produce colour comparisons, as a gauge of the
fineness, or the mixture of silver and copper alloy.  Under the best of circumstances, they were very crude16
38  Grierson, Numismatics, pp. 100-11, 150-5; Grierson, ‘Medieval Numismatics’, pp.  124-34;
Grierson, ‘Coin Wear and the Frequency Table’, pp.  i-xvi; Grierson, ‘Weight and Coinage’, pp.  iii-xvii;
Girard, ‘Guerre des monnaies’, pp.  83-101; Fournial, Histoire monétaire, pp.  9-38.
39   See pp.  8-9  above.  But subsequently, Sargent and Velde, Big Problem of Small Change, did
conclude that commercial transactions using coin were generally conducted by tale, rather than by weight:
pp.  16-19, 22, 75.
measuring devices that were rarely accurate within five or even ten per cent. 
38  The only certain way to have
detected and measure changes in silver contents after a debasement was by melting the coins, in order to
separate the silver from the copper.  No merchant, of course, could have afforded to take such drastic
measures, though mint officials sometimes did so.  Even differences in the stamp on the obverse and reverse
sides, if observed, would not have been  an indication of the actual changes in value, since such changes took
place with changes in princes and mint-masters, without debasements.
Indeed, contrary to some erroneous views in the economic history literature, most people – whether
merchants, tradesmen, artisans, labourers, peasants, etc. – usually always accepted coins by tale – i.e., by
number, at face-value, without ever weighing, assaying, or otherwise testing them. 
39  Indeed, as contended
earlier, coins, with the prince’s official stamp, certifying its value, circulated with a premium value or agio
over the comparable value of the bullion contents precisely because their ability to do so provided significant
savings on transactions costs, vital for all trades.  To be sure, in foreign trade transactions, some wealthy
merchants – Italian or Hanseatic in particular – might have tested gold coins in large-value transactions,
because the relative savings on transaction costs were lower and the costs of fraud were higher.  But very few,
if any, would have done so for low value silver coins circulating in domestic trade.
Even if some persons had done so, and discovered deficiencies in the silver content, how and when
would they have discounted the value of, say, a penny coin?   Consider the fact that, in 1300, the Flemish
silver penny groot, then 11 deniers 12 grains argent-le-roy (95.667 per cent commercially fine), contained
3.794 grams pure silver; but in 1384, when the Burgundian era commenced, it was 6  deniers argent-le-roy
(50.00 per cent fine = 47.917 per cent pure), with only 1.173 grams pure silver (Table 1A).  Over those years,17
40  If the debasement reduced the silver contents by exactly ten per cent, then by the formula given
in note 34 for changes in the traite values  --  ΔT (traite) = [1/(1 - x)] - 1 –  the requisite ‘discount’, by this
approach, would have been 11.11%.  How would such a discount have been achieved? 
41  For the construction of the Flemish Consumer Price Index, see Munro, ‘Wage-Stickiness’, Table
1,  p.  231; and Munro, ‘Builders’ Wages’, pp. 1018-28, and Table 1, pp.  1048-49.  See also Tables 1 and
3, in the Appendix.
would its value have been discounted to just one-third of a penny groot (by relative silver values: actually
30.91 per cent)?  Of course not: the 1384 groot still circulated at the same nominal value of 1d, just as it had
done in 1300. 
40  Nevertheless, if confidence in the coinage in general did wane, especially with increased
supplies of counterfeit coins, merchants and tradesmen would have finally resorted to discounting the entire
coinage: by raising their prices, and thus eliminating, as suggested earlier, the agio on coinage.  Since the
prince’s mints would no longer have received much bullion, that situation might then have induced yet
another round of debasements.
Did inflation eliminate the potential gains from debasements?
The second and seemingly compelling objection or counter-argument from the critics is that the
consequent and quickly ensuing inflation would have eliminated any possible gains from the debasement. 
Let us first consider the statistical evidence on coinage debasements, mint outputs, and prices trends in
Burgundian Flanders, presented in Tables 1 - 4, and Figures 1 - 5.  That evidence provides convincing proof
that these periodic coinage debasements did indeed increase the Flemish coined money supply, and also that
such increases did lead to some periodic inflations.   The silver content of the Flemish penny groot fell from
1.173 grams in 1384 to one of just 0.522 grams in 1482:  a loss of 0.651 grams = 55.49 per cent of its 1384
contents.  During this same era, the Flemish Consumer Price Index (base 1451-75 = 100) rose from 122.185
to 193.932: i.e. an increase of  71.747  = 58.72 per cent.
41  Those statistics seem comparable.
  But these statistics are misleading in several ways.  In the first place, a comparison of  diminutions
in metal contents with rises in prices, in this fashion, is statistically false, since we are dealing with
reciprocals.  The following is the formula needed to compare the consequence of a reduction of the coin’s18
42    For definitions of fineness and weight, in terms of the marc de Troyes, see nn.  5-6,  12-13 above.
The computation of the traite or money-of-account value of a marc of commercially fine silver simply
involves the calculation of the number of coins, of a given denomination, struck from the alloyed marc (i.e.,
with the copper added) – a number known as the taille per marc – and then a multiplication of that number
by the official value of the coin itself.  Thus T = (taille * face value)/percentage fineness.
43  See Table 1A, and n.  35  above. 
silver contents with the expected rise in the money-of-account value  of a marc weight of commercially fine
silver (244.753 g): i.e., its traite value.
42
 ΔT (traite) = [1/(1 - x)] - 1
in which x represents the percentage reduction of the fine silver content of the penny and the corresponding
pence in money of account; and  ΔT represents the consequent change in the money-of-account value of a
marc of fine silver after the coinage debasement.  By this formula, a 10-per cent reduction in the fine silver
contents of the penny would have produced  a 11.11 per cent rise in the nominal value of the new coined marc
of silver, i.e., a potential increase of 11.11 per cent in the coined money supply.  
By the crude, simplistic Quantity of Theory of Money, that should also have been the rate of inflation.
For  Flanders, over the century 1384 - 1482, the expected rate of inflation, resulting from a 55.47 per cent
reduction in the penny’s silver content, should have been 124.57 per cent – instead of the far more modest
58.72 per cent rise in prices that did occur, as just noted. 
43  While this snapshot is useful for purely heuristic
purposes, the real statistical tests would have to be measured in year to year changes in the domestic price
index, following each coinage debasement. 
The historical lesson is clearly demonstrated in Table 4.  Coinage debasements, and consequent
increases in money supplies,  never produced correspondingly proportional inflations.  There are five possible
reasons why inflations were never directly and predictably related to coinage debasements. First, coinage
debasements rarely succeeded in reminting the entire domestic coined money supply, even if the financial
terms seemed compelling for merchants to surrender their own current coins to the mint.  For many others
would have chosen to retain them, knowing that their higher bullion contents would later fetch a higher19
44  See p.  8 and n.  18 above.
market value.  Second,  even if a silver debasement was also designed to attract other sources of bullion, as
well, especially from neighbouring lands, the expected cost or monetary  loss would have been some outflow
of the other metal, gold, for reasons noted earlier.  Third,  coins did not account for the entire money supply;
and, therefore, we  must also take account of credit changes.  I have dealt with this subject at length, in other
publications, in which I contended that credit instruments never fully remedied any shortages in the medieval
supplies of coined money, and did not  effectively combat deflation.
44 
Fourth, consider the logic of the modernized Quantity Theory of Money, whose basic formula is M.V
= P.y.   Any inflationary consequences  – i.e.,  a rise in P (Consumer Price Index) –  from an increase in the
money supply (M) may have been offset by a decrease in the income velocity of money (V) and/or by
increases in net national product (NNP) and income (i.e., y).  The more useful version of the quantity theory
is the Cambridge Cash Balances equation: M = k.P.y, in which k is the reciprocal of V, i.e., k = 1/V and V
= 1/k.  The symbol or variable k represents that percentage share of net national income that the public
chooses to hold in cash balances: i.e., rather than profitably investing those funds.  The reasons for holding
cash balances are known collectively as liquidity preference: involving a mix of transaction, precautionary,
and speculative motives. According to Keynesian economics, an increase in the money supply, without any
changes in liquidity preference, would have led to a fall in interest rates, which in turn would have led to an
increase in k (cash balances held).  That is the equivalent to a reduction in V, i.e. the income velocity of
money.
Fifth, perhaps the most important factor was simply the failure of coinage debasements to counter-act
or fully offset the prevailing deflationary consequences of long-term, widespread monetary scarcities – i.e.,
the prevalent ‘bullion famines.’  Indeed, one obvious reason why they failed to do so is that coinage
debasements were almost always periodic or episodic and thus relatively short-term, as well as being merely
regional in their impacts.  Furthermore, in Burgundian Flanders, three episodes of coinage debasement were20
45 See Tables 1A and 1B.
46 See above, pp.  30-31; and Table 4.  See also, in support of these views, Munro, ‘Monetary
Contraction and Industrial Change’, pp. 95 - 162; Munro, ‘Mint Outputs, Money, and Prices’, pp. 31-122;
Munro, ‘Petty Coinage’, pp. 387-423; Munro, ‘Wage-Stickiness’, pp. 185 - 297; Munro, ‘Profit Inflation’,
pp.  13-71; Munro, ‘Monetary Origins of the Price Revolution’,  pp.  1-34;  Munro, ‘Black Death’,  pp.
335-364.
followed by the exact monetary opposite: a coinage renforcement or a restoration (usually only partial) and
strengthening of the coinage, adding more silver: in 1384, in 1389-90, and in 1433-35.   By necessarily
contracting the money supply – i.e., in reminting debased coins into necessarily  fewer but stronger coins,
these renforcements had severely deflationary consequences, readily apparent in Table 3.
45
We may offer three more specific observations about the inflationary consequences of coinage
debasements.   First, when price changes did take place following debasements, they did not do so
immediately, but relatively slowly, since some  time would have been necessary for the increased quantity
of coins  to enter and become part of the coinage circulation.  That observation applies also to the previously
enunciated proposition: that wholesalers and retailers would have ultimately reacted to a debasement only
by raising their prices.  Their success in doing so, however, still depended upon the increased circulation of
the new coins. 
Second,  the extent of any subsequent rise in prices was far from being uniform.  The price changes
for individual commodities depended on both their supply and demand elasticities; and the latter must also
be seen in terms of both the price- and income-elasticities of demand.
46  Provided, therefore, that the
merchants had spent those double groot coins quickly enough, after receiving their newly debased coins, and
spent them on the right selection of goods and services, they would certainly have profited – i.e., realized a
genuine net real gain.
Third, we may further observe that money-changers and merchants who gained from delivering
bullion to the mints and quickly spending their increased number of coins benefited from what is now known
in economics as asymmetric information: i.e.,  that they were privy to the knowledge of the mint changes that21
47  See Gandal and  Sussman, ‘Asymmetric Information’, pp.  440-457.  Note that in 2001, George
Akerlof, Michael Spence, and Joseph Stiglitz won the Nobel Prize in Economics for their analyses of markets
with asymmetric information.
48  Since the mint was the property of the prince, the prince was responsible for the capital and
maintenance costs of the mint  buildings, but not of the mint-master’s equipment.
remained unknown, for some time, to the general public.
47  But inevitably such information would have been
finally disseminated to the general public.  That information, combined with the increased number of coins
in circulation, would have led to some inflation, and thus to some loss, though rarely a total loss, of the net
gains from a debasement.
The mintage fees: brassage and seigniorage
As noted earlier, the mint retained from the bullion supplied a small proportion – usually under ten
per cent (Table 1B) – for the stipulated mintage fees, which comprised two items: the brassage, for the mint-
master; and the seigniorage, for the prince.  The brassage fee can be readily understood: that it cost money
to make money.  Obviously, the mint-master had to be compensated for his production costs: the copper alloy
added, the labour costs of production, the capital costs of his tools (hammers, dyes, furnaces, forges, melting
pots, shears, etc.), and the administrative costs of operating the mint.
48  Those costs were normally modest,
except for the petty coinage , the monnaies noires, with high copper contents.  In accordance with the Flemish
mint indenture of June 1418, the mint-master retained 7 of the 136 double groot coins struck.  That amounted
to 1s 2d groot or 5.15 per cent of the bullion delivered.  But, in accordance with the next mint indenture, for
the debasement of November 1428,  the mint master received only a minuscule increase of just 1/8 double
groot = a quarter-groot,  or just 6 mites.  In fact, his share of the total bullion received fell from 5.15 per cent
to 4.62 per cent – an amount that likely was insufficient to cover his increased costs for labour and copper
alloy.  So much for the view that mint-masters had instigated debasements for their own profit.
The other mintage fee was seigniorage: the  tax that the prince imposed on minting coins, i.e., as a
fixed percentage of the bullion delivered to his mint, by virtue, as noted earlier,  of his official monopoly on
coinage within his realm.   Counterfeiting was, of course, a very serious violation of the prince’s monopoly22
49  See Munro, ‘Profits of Counterfeiting’, pp. 127-48;  Munro, ‘Medieval Monetary Metrology’,  pp.
173-99.
50 See Table 1 B: with data on all the silver coinage changes from 1384 to 1482.  Note the increase
in the seigniorage rates with all the major debasements, and their reductions with a  return to stronger and
stable coinages.
on coinage, and indeed of his sovereignty; and it was usually treated, therefore, as a capital crime.
49
Clearly, at least in proportional terms, the agent who realized the greatest gain was the prince; i.e.,
here, Duke Philip the Good.  In his 1428 Flemish debasement,  his seigniorage tax was increased from 2
double groot coins (4d) to 3 such coins (6d),  a 50-per cent increase, increasing his share of the bullion
delivered to the mint from 1.47 per cent to 1.95 per cent.  
Indeed, the single best test for whether or not a coinage debasement was aggressive and motivated
by profit-seeking is whether or not the prince increased his seigniorage rates in implementing that
debasement.
50  If the debasement had been purely defensive in nature, and in particular designed to remedy
deficiencies in the coinage supply, why would the prince have raised his seigniorage rate?  Consider, also,
and in particular, the fact that the higher the seigniorage rate, the lower would have been the mint price for
merchants, thus reducing their incentive to bring bullion to that particular prince’s mint, in competition with
other mints.  Calculating the most effective increase in rates was a skilled art.
The prince’s  increased mint profits were based on two factors: the increase in the seigniorage rate
itself, and  the success of the debasement in increasing the Flemish mint output, subject to the constraints on
total mintage fees just noted.  As Table 6  demonstrates,  Duke Philip’s 1428 debasement was very successful
indeed : from 1428 to 1429, it increased the quantity of silver bullion struck by 1475.68 per cent (from
1,078.65 kg to 16,996.01 kg); the current value coinage output, in pounds groot Flemish, by 1666.02 per cent
(from £5,267.28 to £93,021.38 groot); and the seigniorage revenues, by 1554.47 per cent (from £123 to
£2,035 groot Flemish).  As this table also indicates, coinage debasements were subject to rapidly diminishing
returns, a condition that often forced prince, as just noted,  to engage in subsequent debasements.   In this
case, however, Duke Philip the Good instead chose – if in response to pressure from the Flemish towns – to23
51   See p, 27  and nn.  57-58, below.
52  See Vaughan, Philip the Bold; Vaughan, John the Fearless;  Vaughan, Philip the Good;  Vaughan,
Charles the Bold; Calmette, Les grands ducs de Bourgogne;  Nicholas, Medieval Flanders, pp.  317-99.
53  In a speech before the deans of Ghent's craft guilds, in January 1447. Cited (and translated) by
Vaughan, Philip the Good, pp. 307-08, quoting from the Flemish texts in Fris, Dagboek van Gent,  vol. I, pp.
57-68.
reform the Flemish coinage and impose a monetary unification on his recently acquired Burgundian Low
Countries, in 1433-5.
51
Debasements and warfare in the Burgundian Low Countries
Of course, it would now be an enormous and ultimately also a tedious task to demonstrate that each
and every one  of the numerous Flemish coinage debasements had been undertaken primarily for such fiscal
motives: specifically to finance warfare and defence.  Only the major wars need to be cited here. 
52  First,
under Duke Philip the Bold (r. 1384-1404):  the Second Artevelde or Ghent rebellion (aided by English
intervention), from 1382-85; and the Guelders war of 1388.  Under Duke John the Fearless (r. 1404-1419):
the Burgundian-Armagnac civil wars, 1411-19, culminating in Duke John’s murder at Montereau. His son
and successor Philip the Good (r. 1419-67) immediately defied the French Dauphin Charles (later Charles
VII), by contracting a military alliance with England,  whose king, Henry V, had achieved such a major
victory over the French at Agincourt (1415).  During his wars with Charles, Philip also became involved in
the civil war in Holland-Zeeland (Hoeks vs.  Kabiljauws), which also embroiled him in conflict with England,
in 1424- 28, ending with Burgundian acquisition of these Imperial counties.   Duke Philip subsequently
complained to his subjects how costly were these wars:
53
 You also well know how, during a lull in the war in France, I had to wage a burdensome and
murderous war against the English [Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester] in my lands of Holland,
Zeeland and Friesland in order to protect Flanders ...  This war...had cost me, besides all the
heavy expenses that I incurred throughout this period in the French war, over a million gold
saluts, which at first I was extremely ill-prepared to find.
The troubled Anglo-Burgundian military alliance finally ended, in 1435, with  Duke Philip’s volte-
face,  in making peace with Charles VII, by the Treaty of Arras, which then led to the Anglo-Burgundian war24
54 See sources cited in n.  53, and also Munro, ‘Anglo-Burgundian Alliance’, pp.  225-44; and Munro,
Wool, Cloth, and Gold, pp.  65-126.
55 Duchess Marie, unlike her father Charles, but following her grandfather’s admonition to maintain
‘la bonne monnoie’, had opposed further debasements.  The debasement of 18 July 1482 was thus undertaken
by widower husband Maximilian (Table 1A).  See Spufford, Money, p.  313.  See also n.  61 below.
of 1436-1439, complicated by the Dutch-Wendish wars of 1438-1441.
54  Then, relative peace — and an
absence from coinage debasements – ensued over the next two decades, until Philip’s son Charles the Rash
(r. 1467-1477) renewed the Burgundian conflicts with Louis XI’s France.  That conflict began with the rebel
League of the Common Weal, 1465-66 (i.e., before Charles became duke).  That in turn led to Charles’
suppression of the French-sponsored revolt of Liège, in 1468; his abortive invasion of Normandy, in 1471;
and then his wars with Imperial Alsace, Lorraine, and the Swiss, all allies of Louis XI, culminating in the
Burgundian defeat and Charles’ death, at the hands of the Swiss, at Nancy (Lorraine), in 1477.   In that year,
his daughter Marie married the Habsburg Archduke Maximilian (d.  1519).  Her accidental death in March
1482 led to a disputed regency (their son Philip vs Maximilian) and protracted civil wars in Flanders, and to
even more horrendous coinage debasements, ending only in the 1490s, which events are all beyond the scope
of this study.
55
Some brief conclusions: debasements were generally more harmful than beneficial
We may conclude that late-medieval coinage debasements, at least those examined in Burgundian
Flanders,  were generally more harmful than beneficial.  They failed to provide any long-term remedy for the
combined problems of chronic monetary scarcity and deflation.  Indeed, as noted earlier, the Burgundian
rulers generally ended their rounds of debasements with severely deflationary renforcements.  Second, as
observed earlier, the combination of coinage debasements and related bullionist measures generally served
only to aggravate monetary scarcities by impeding both bullion flows and coinage circulations, and also by
encouraging hoarding.  Third, to the extent that debasements did lead to some degree of inflation, that
inflation reduced real incomes – since wages normally lagged behind prices – and thus provided an additional25
56  See  Munro, ‘ Urban Public Finances in Late-Medieval Flanders’,  pp.  973-1026; Munro, ‘Wage-
Stickiness’, pp.  185-297.
57  See Munro, ‘Gold, Guilds, and Government’, pp. 153 - 205; Munro, Wage-Stickiness, pp. 185 -
297;  Munro, ‘Builders’ Wages’, pp. 1018-28; and publications by Van Werveke in n.  33 above.
58  See Munro, Wool, Cloth  and Gold, pp.  74-76, and n.  34 in particular.  The most important study
on this issue is Spufford, ‘Coinage, Taxation, and the Estates General’,  pp.  63-88.  In March 1418, the
Flemish towns or the Four Members (vier leden) had in fact requested no changes for the next 40 years: that
‘dese munte sal ghedeurch zijn zonder angheven ofte veranderen xl jaer’; but that period was reduced to 15
years in the final ordinance, in: ARA, Rekenkamer, reg.  no.  1158, fo.  7vo.  When Philip became count in
his own name, in 1419, after his father’s murder, the Four Members required him to repeat this promise.
Gilliodts-van Severen, Estaple de Bruges, vol.  I, no.  630, p.  526. See above, n.  51.
tax burden on the entire population.
56  Fourth, debasements injured creditors, by reducing the real values of
their investment returns and repayments; and in that respect, they damaged Flemish international commercial
relations.  
Finally, coinage alterations sometimes caused social unrest:  understandably so, when, as just
emphasized,  money wages usually lagged behind debasement-induced rises in consumer prices.  But,
somewhat paradoxically, the opposite monetary policy, a coinage renforcement (strengthening), was the more
likely cause of unrest, especially industrial strikes, when Burgundian or civic leaders imposed sudden wage
cuts – reductions in nominal money wages – as a necessary component  of monetary reform.  Yet such unrest,
the product of ‘money illusions’,  usually proved to be socially unjustified, because those reforms usually led
to a deflation in which the fall in consumer prices proved to be greater than the nominal wage cuts, so that
real wages actually rose (as they did in the 1390s and 1440s).
57
Finally, the view that coinage debasements had been undertaken to remedy severe coin shortages,
and thus to benefit the public, is contradicted Flemish public demands, as put forth by their Estates or Town
Assemblies, which evidently regarded debasements as a cure worse than the disease. After two of Philip the
Good’s debasements, the assembly of Flemish towns (the Estates) forced the duke not to undertake any
further coinage alterations for specified periods: in 1418-19,  for fifteen years;
58 and in 1433, for twenty26
59  Munro, Wool, Cloth and Gold, pp.  101-103; Spufford, ‘Coinage, Taxation, and the Estates
General’, pp.  143-53;  Van Dusye and De Busscher, Archives de la ville de Gand, no.  552, p. 192: charter
of 18 January 1434.
60 Edward IV reduced the silver contents of the sterling penny by 20.00% and the gold contents of
the English noble by 25.93%, thus altering the mint-ratio in favour of gold.  Duke Philip (d.  15 June 1467)
reduced the silver content of the penny groot by 13.57% in May 1466 and his son Duke Charles did so by
another 3.77% in October 1467.  The value of gold coins and the gold traite rose from £15 0s 0d in 1454 to
£15 18s 4d in October 1467, with an overall change in the mint ratio favouring silver.  See the details in
Munro, Wool, Cloth, and Gold, pp.  160-77, Appendices B - K, pp.  190-211; and nn.  26,  30, and 32 above.
61 See p.  24, and n.  55, above.
62  See note 1.  For the principal offenders, see Spufford, Money and Its Use, chapter 13, ‘The
Scourge of Debasement’, pp.  289-318, especially Table 5, p.  295, and graph III (for 12 currencies, 1252-
1500), pp.  296-299.  The two principal exceptions were: England before Henry VIII’s ‘Great Debasement’,
of 1542-52; and Spain (Castile), from 1497 to 1686.  See also the next note.
years.
59  Philip, however, broke his first promise, chiefly by engaging in debasements in his recently acquired
and neighbouring provinces of Namur, Holland-Zealand, and Brabant, but also once, within Flanders itself,
at Ghent, in November  1428.  Yet he did indeed keep his second promise (at least for silver), and for more
than thirty years, up to the final year of his reign, in 1466-67.  In that year, Philip resumed his long-dormant
practice of debasements, of both coinages, partly in reaction to the debasements of King Edward IV of
England, in 1464-65, during the Wars of the Roses.
60  But Duke Philip’s debasements were mild compared
to those of his successors: Duke Charles the Bold  and Archduke Maximilian, from 1467 to the early 1490s:
especially in the 1480s, years of costly, destructive foreign and civil wars (which again lie beyond the scope
of this study).
61
In viewing the monetary history of late-medieval western Europe, no one would contend that
Burgundian Low Countries were unique:  for certainly most, if not all, countries and principalities then
practised very similar monetary policies,  with the same observable links between warfare, coinage
debasements, and seigniorage profits.
62  What does makes this study unique for this era is the documentation
for those policies and their economic consequences: the fact that only the Burgundian Low Countries provide
such complete archival evidence, especially in the exceptionally detailed mint accounts– with details for each27
63  See the tables and their sources; and the list of my publications in the List of References.  While
similar documentation and archival sources can also be found for late-medieval England, there are some
significant differences: in particular, the Tower Mint accounts do not provide as detailed evidence on coin
denominations, brassage, and seigniorage.  The more  important difference is that, apart from Edward IV’s
monetary changes of 1464-65, which came after a half-century of monetary stability, England was one of the
few exceptions in not otherwise pursuing these monetary polices, as indicated in the previous note.
coin denomination issued, brassage, seigniorage, total outs in both fine metal struck and money-account
values of coin issued –  reports of monetary officials, consumer prices, industrial data, to permit us to measure
the causes, processes, and consequences of these monetary policies.
6328
64  See note 1.  For an excellent summary, see Spufford, Money and Its Use, chapter 13, ‘The Scourge
of Debasement,’ pp.  289-318.
65  Castile (Spain) struck silver reals at 93.06 per cent fineness, at 67 per marc (230.0465 grams)
during those years, except for one temporary exception in 1642 – at 83.75 per marc; and in 1643, the original
1497 coinage was fully restored.  The gold coins were struck at 22 carats = 91.67 per cent fine. See Ulloa,
‘Castilian Seignorage,’ pp. 459-79;  Motomura, ‘The Best and Worst of Currencies,’ pp. 104 - 27; Motomura,
‘New Data on Minting’, pp.  331-67; and Hamilton, Price Revolution, pp.  46-103.
66 Bowden, Wool Trade, pp. 1-76.
67  On American silver imports and government revenues, see Hamilton, Price Revolution, pp.  12-45;
Cross, ‘South American Bullion,’ pp.  397-423; TePaske, ‘New World World Silver,’ pp.  425-45; Munro,
‘Monetary Origins,’ pp.  1-34, especially Table 1.2, pp.  4-5.  
APPENDIX:
Two Late-Medieval  Monetary Exceptions: Spain and England
********************************
Certainly historical studies of many principalities in late-medieval, and early-modern western Europe
provide equally strong links between  between warfare, coinage debasements, and seigniorage profits, i.e.,
similar to those examined in the monetary history of Flanders during the Burgundian era (1384-1482).
64
Nevertheless, those  links were not universal in late-medieval and early-modern Europe.  Notable exceptions
were late-medieval England, before the reign of Edward IV – or really, before the ‘Great Debasement’ of
Henry VIII and his successor (1542-1552); and early modern Spain, with virtually no debasements at all from
1497 to 1686, certainly none that affected the traditional gold and silver coinages.
65   
There are two possible explanations for this surprising monetary anomaly: i.e.,  that Spain, and to a
lesser extent, England had in effect abjured coinage debasements.   The first is a seductive financial
explanation.   Neither country had evidently required seigniorage profits to finance warfare as much as had,
say,  France and the Low Countries, because of alternative, lucrative sources of royal tax revenues:  for
England, the export taxes on wool;
66 and for Spain, the import taxes – the quinto or ‘royal fifth’ – on imports
of American silver (from Bolivia-Peru and Mexico).
67
For Spain, however, two important historical circumstances undermine or vitiate this financial theory.29
68 See sources in note 65; and Munro, ‘Monetary Origins’, Table 1.2, pp.  4-5.
69  Van der Wee, ‘Monetary, Credit, and Banking Systems’, pp. 373-76, Table 28; Munro, ‘Medieval
Origins of the Financial Revolution’, pp.  535-36; Gelabert, ‘Castile’, pp. 207-212 
The first is that the commitment to abjure debasements of the gold and silver coinages dates from at least
1497, and possibly from 1471 – and thus long before any substantial amounts of ‘treasure’ – first gold, and
then enormous amounts of silver – were imported from the Americas (Bolivia-Peru and Mexico).  Those
imports had begun, in very small amounts from the early sixteenth century; but imports of silver in particular
did not surpass 10,000 kg a year until the later 1530s, and the very major imports did not really begin until
the 1560s.
68  
The second ‘inconvenient fact’ is the well-known fiscal crises that Philip II and Castile underwent,
especially in the 1550s.  In 1557, Philip II supposedly declared ‘bankruptcy’; but in fact, his government,
having found itself currently unable to pay the annual interest on short-term loans called asientos, resolved
that problem by converting them into five-percent perpetual but redeemable juros al quittar, equivalent to
what were commonly known elsewhere as rentes: i.e., annuities.  That pattern was repeated in 1575 and 1596.
During the sixteenth century, the Spanish funded public long-term debt, in the form of these juros, ballooned
from 2.996 million ducats (escudos of 375 maravedís) in 1504 to  80.040 million ducats in 1598 (on the death
of Philip II).
69   Given indeed the continuously parlous, precarious state of Habsburg Spain’s public finances,
despite the revenues derived from the Spanish American silver trade, at least in the second half of the
sixteenth century, one may well wonder why Philip II did not resort to the  well established European fiscal
custom of coinage debasements.
The answer may instead lie more in the political and constitutional realm, rather than the financial.
In 1471, and thus before the Spanish unification, King Henry IV of Castile issued an ordinance known as the
Pragmatica, which renounced the regal right to debase the gold and silver coinages, and to alter the
seigniorage rates.   That renunciation was  deemed to be a necessary component of the crown’s monetary
reform policy to suppress all competing baronial mints (about 150) in Castile.   It is certainly worth noting30
70 Spufford, Money and Its Use, Table 5, p.  295, and graph III, pp.  296-99.  See also p.  314: ‘The
very worst sequence of debasements in the whole of fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Europe can be seen in
Castile.  By 1480, the unchanging Florentine florin was exchanged for around 375 Castilian maravedis,
whereas 130 years earlier it had been exchanged for 20 maravedis.  In other words, the Castilian money-of-
account had lost around 95% of its value, a greater long-term fall in value than that of any other European
money.’
71   In his Price Revolution, Hamilton erred, however (p.  52), in stating that ‘the Crown exacted no
seigniorage’ on gold and silver coinages, but only brassage fees; and that error was repeated in Boyer-
Xambeu, Deleplace, and Gillard, Private Money and Public Currencies, p. 110 (but without citation).  In fact,
the Crown exacted seigniorages on both coinages (except for those issued on behalf of the king himself): for
gold, 1 escudo (= 400  maravedís) per marc (230.0465 g); and for silver, 50  maravedís per marc.  Since 67
silver reals were struck from a marc of silver, at a value of 34 maravedís each, that seigniorage amounted to
1.4706 reals = 2.195% of the fine silver bullion coined, a higher rate than that normally exacted at the
Flemish and English mints (See Table 1B).  The brassage fees, in addition to the seigniorage, on the Castilian
coinages were normally 34 maravedís (= 1 real) per marc of fine silver and 125 maravedís per marc of fine
gold.  During this period (1497-1686) the mint fees remained unchanged.  See sources cited in n.  62 above.
72  See n.  65  above. 
that, before this agreement, the kings of Castile had been amongst the worst offenders, later-medieval Europe,
in debasing their coinages: as much as 95 percent, from ca.  1300.
70  But this reformed coinage policy may
not have been fully implemented until 1474, when Ferdinand of Aragon and his wife Isabella confirmed this
Pragmatica, as joint rulers of Castile, with the parliamentary Cortes;  and the right to debase the coinage and
to augment the seigniorage rates was again formally revoked with their new coinage of 1497.
71  From 1497
to 1686, the Spanish crown consistently minted (with one exceptional, minor deviation in 1642-43) two silver
coins at 93.06 percent fineness, that is, without any debasements or any other coinage alterations – an
experience unique in early-modern European monetary history. All of the available evidence does indeed
indicate that from 1497 to 1686 the Spanish monarchs did consistently refuse to accept the repeated advice
to debase the coinages.
72 
The Spanish crown’s commitment to abjure, forswear debasements and restrict seigniorage on its gold
and silver coinages did not apply, however, to its petty vellon coinages, which underwent severe debasements
from 1599 (becoming pure copper coins) with greatly augmented seigniorage fees to the mid-seventeenth31
73   Before the reign of Philip III (1598-1621), the Spanish government had issued only small amounts
of these petty coins, known as vellon coinage. From at least 1471, the Castilian and then Spanish kings had
issued a largely copper fractional coinage called blancas, with a nominal money-of-account value of 0.5
maravedí (compared to a value of 34 maravedís for the silver real):  but with a very small amount of silver
10 grains = 3.47 percent),  to convince the public that it was indeed precious-metal ‘money’.  In 1497, that
fineness was reduced to 2.43 percent (7 grains);  in 1552, to  1.909 percent (5.5 grains); in 1566, to 1.39
percent (4 grains); in  1583, to a fineness of just 1.39 percent (containing only 0.0146 g silver), and a nominal
value of 0.5 maravedís. Subsequently, in 1597,  Philip II (r.1556-1598) agreed to the issue of a coin worth
exactly one maravedí , with a fineness of only 0.34 percent (just 1 grain of silver); but whether any were
actually issued is not clear.  Finally, in 1599, Philip III issued vellon coins that contained only copper.  So
large were these vellon issues in the first half of the seventeenth century that they became the single most
powerful factor in the inflation that Spain endured during this final era of the Price Revolution.  See sources
cited in note 65, and also Hamilton, Price Revolution, pp.  73-103;  Hamilton, War and Prices in Spain, pp.
9-35.
74 Mayhew, ‘Sterlings’, pp.  54-68.
75  Munro,’Black Death’, pp.  335-64; Munro, ‘Wage-Stickiness’, pp.  207-16;  Mayhew,
‘Numismatic Evidence’,  1-15.
century: at the very time of increased warfare and sharply declining imports of Spanish American silver.
73
In the case of medieval England, for reasons noted earlier in this paper, the crown’s reluctance or
inability to imposed coinage debasements was also probably more political and constitutional, at its root, than
financial.  Before England, under Edward III, finally adopted an effective gold coinage (1343-51), its sterling
silver coins, 92.5 percent pure silver, had served as an international medium of exchange in northern Europe
– a  fact that had led to various continental imitations, especially in the early fourteenth century
74.  Evidently
the commercial benefits as well as the national prestige from having such a universally admired currency were
factors that had inhibited English coinage debasements.  Shortly after the Black Death (1348), which
unleashed a combination of real and monetary forces that led to severe inflation, Edward III chose to
implement what must be regarded as a very minor and purely defensive debasement of silver, following a
prolonged ‘bullion famine’, marked by very low mint outputs and severe deflation.
75 Parliament’s immediate
response to that  ensuing inflation was to blame the debasement, and not the effects of the Black Death.  In
1352,  by its Statute of Purveyors, Parliament thus decreed that the coinage ‘shall never be worsened, neither
in weight nor in fineness (aloi)’, without its consent.  Not until 1411-12 did the crown again implement32
76  Munro, Wool, Cloth, and Gold, pp.  60-62.  The statute required a parliamentary review of the
coinage within two years.  See Rotuli Parliamentorum, III, 658-9: no.  2; Feavearyear, Pound Sterling, pp.
37-39.
77   Statutes of the Realm, vol.  I, p.  322: Stat.  25 Edwardi III, stat.  5, c.  13.  See Munro, Wool,
Cloth, and Gold, pp.  35, 159-63; Feavearyear, Pound Sterling, pp.  15-45.
78 Munro, Wool, Cloth, and Gold, pp.  168-71; Mayhew, ‘Yorkist Recoinage’, pp.  62-73.  See also
n.  60, above.
79 See nn.  58-59 above.
another debasement, another purely defensive debasement, and it did so with an Act of Parliament.
76 The
crown in fact did observe that parliamentary statute for over a century – until Edward IV’s debasement of
1464.
77  Edward’s debasement, it must be noted, again occurred after a half century of monetary stability; and
had the debasement (20 percent for silver) and the seigniorage rate been more modest, it may well also have
been deemed defensive.
78  We have also noted how, though with much less success, the parliamentary Estates
in Burgundian Flanders had also sought the Duke of Burgundy’s agreements to maintain stable coinage,
without debasements.
79
Nevertheless, one cannot disregard the fiscal-financial aspects of the English crown’s reluctance  to
pursue the continental monetary policies of coinage debasements; for not for another sixty years,  not until
1526, did the crown, under Henry VIII (1509-1547), again implement a debasement, and one that was also
purely defensive.  This was therefore, long before and distinctly different from Henry’s later ‘Great
Debasement’ (1542-1547).   There can be no doubt that the crown’s principal source of revenues came from
the taxation of trade, most especially from the export taxes levied on both raw wool and woollen textiles,
especially after the large increases in the wool export-tax rates from the 1330s, on the eve of the Hundred
Years’ War.  Subsequently, despite the long-term decline of the English wool trade from the 1420s – in part
because of both export taxes and bullionist impositions on the wool trade, those export tax revenues still
remained substantial up until the end of the fifteenth century.   But not long before Henry VIII’s Great
Debasement ,  the wool export tax revenues had virtually disappeared .  By the 1520s,  the cloth export trade33
80 See Munro, Wool, Cloth, and Gold; Munro, ‘Medieval Woollens’, pp.  278-98.
81   In 1601, the number of pence cut to the Troy pound was changed  from 720d to 744d, reducing
the penny’s weight from 0.5184 g to 0.5017 grams.  Otherwise, from the Elizabethan recoinage of 1560 to
1817, the English silver coinage retained its traditional sterling fineness: 11 oz 2 dwt silver and 18 dwt copper
=  92.50 percent pure silver.   Feavearyear, Pound Sterling, Appendix I, p.  435; Appendix III.ii, p.  439.
had almost totally displaced the wool trade, but  cloth exports still remained very lightly taxed before 1558.
80
Possibly that major increase in the cloth export taxes trade was a factor in permitting Elizabeth I  to restore
the English coinage, or partly restore it, in 1561 and allowed subsequent English rulers thereafter to eschew
coinage debasements, apart from one minor weight reduction, in 1601, until 1817.
81
If the Henrician Great Debasement seems to be an anomaly in English monetary history, we may also
contend  that the monetary histories of medieval England and of early-modern Spain are themselves
anomalies in European  history, and that the debasement-ridden monetary histories of Flanders and the Low
Countries, France, Italy, Germany, etc., represent the historic norm.  Certainly, the Burgundian  rulers of the
Low Countries and the French kings had enjoyed no such alternative sources of commercial revenues – non
akin to English wool exports or Spanish silver imports – to permit them to forgo the seigniorage revenues
from coinage debasements.  At the same time, they also were not encumbered with constitutional institutions
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1300 - 1482                                                                                                          
Date Fineness in Fineness in Fineness Taille to Grams Traite of Value of  Index
Argent-le- Argent-le- as a  Marc de Pure Silver Marc de 1 kg Pure 1351 = 
Roy Roy Percent- Troyes in the Groot Troyes in Silver in 100.00
in deniers in grains age Shillings £ groot
1 d groot 1 d groot 1 d groot 1 d groot 1 d groot 1 d groot 1 d groot 1 d groot
1300-4-2 11 11.50 95.660% 59.133 3.7944 5.1513 1.0981 50.73
1331-8-8
10 12.00 87.500% 57.000 3.6006 5.4286 1.1572 53.46
1332-3-13
10 6.00 85.417% 57.500 3.4843 5.6098 1.1958 55.25
1335-5
10 6.00 85.417% 57.500 3.4843 5.6098 1.1958 55.25
1337-5-25
9 0.00 75.000% 60.500 2.9077 6.7222 1.4330 66.20
1343-4-16
8 0.00 66.667% 66.000 2.3692 8.2500 1.7587 81.25
1344-1
8 0.00 66.667% 66.000 2.3692 8.2500 1.7587 81.25
1344-8
8 0.00 66.667% 66.000 2.3692 8.2500 1.7587 81.25
1345-9
8 0.00 66.667% 66.000 2.3692 8.2500 1.7587 81.25
1346-1-20
7 16.00 63.889% 66.000 2.2705 8.6087 1.8351 84.78
1346-8
7 16.00 63.889% 66.000 2.2705 8.6087 1.8351 84.78
1346-11-24
6 23.50 58.160% 66.000 2.0669 9.4567 2.0159 93.13
1351-5-28
6 12.00 54.167% 66.000 1.9250 10.1538 2.1645 100.00
6 12.00 54.167% 66.000 1.9250 10.1538 2.1645 100.00Date Fineness in Fineness in Fineness Taille to Grams Traite of Value of  Index
Argent-le- Argent-le- as a  Marc de Pure Silver Marc de 1 kg Pure 1351 = 
Roy Roy Percent- Troyes in the Groot Troyes in Silver in 100.00
in deniers in grains age Shillings £ groot
1 d groot 1 d groot 1 d groot 1 d groot 1 d groot 1 d groot 1 d groot 1 d groot
1351-7
1353-9-7
6 8.00 52.778% 67.500 1.8340 10.6579 2.2719 104.96
1354-12-20
6 4.00 51.389% 69.000 1.7469 11.1892 2.3852 110.20
1359-10-22
6 0.00 50.000% 70.000 1.6754 11.6667 2.4870 114.90
1361-12-4
6 0.00 50.000% 72.000 1.6289 12.0000 2.5580 118.18
1363-12-1
6 0.00 50.000% 78.000 1.5036 13.0000 2.7712 128.03
1365-4-12
8 0.00 66.667% 114.000 1.3717 14.2500 3.0377 140.34
1368-1-21
7 12.00 62.500% 114.000 1.2859 15.2000 3.2402 149.70
1369-4-21
7 4.00 59.722% 114.000 1.2288 15.9070 3.3909 156.66
1369-9-22
6 0.00 50.000% 100.000 1.1728 16.6667 3.5528 164.14
1373-6-18
6 12.00 54.167% 114.000 1.1145 17.5385 3.7387 172.73
1380-1-30
6 0.00 50.000% 116.000 1.0110 19.3333 4.1213 190.40
1383-9-12
5 18.00 47.917% 116.000 0.9689 20.1739 4.3005 198.68
1384-9-10
6 0.00 50.000% 100.000 1.1728 16.6667 3.5528 164.14
1386-10-29
5 8.00 44.444% 102.000 1.0220 19.1250 4.0769 188.35
5 4.00 43.056% 119.000 0.8486 23.0323 4.9098 226.83Date Fineness in Fineness in Fineness Taille to Grams Traite of Value of  Index
Argent-le- Argent-le- as a  Marc de Pure Silver Marc de 1 kg Pure 1351 = 
Roy Roy Percent- Troyes in the Groot Troyes in Silver in 100.00
in deniers in grains age Shillings £ groot
1 d groot 1 d groot 1 d groot 1 d groot 1 d groot 1 d groot 1 d groot 1 d groot
1387-4-3
1388-10-1
4 20.00 40.278% 121.000 0.7808 25.0345 5.3366 246.55
1389-12-20
5 0.00 41.667% 96.000 1.0180 19.2000 4.0929 189.09
1409-8-17
5 0.00 41.667% 82.667 1.1822 16.5333 3.5244 162.83
1416-12-6
4 4.00 34.722% 85.000 0.9581 20.4000 4.3487 200.91
1418-6-12
5 0.00 41.667% 115.000 0.8498 23.0000 4.9029 226.52
1428-11-7
4 12.00 37.500% 117.500 0.7486 26.1111 5.5661 257.15
1433-10-12
6 0.00 50.000% 144.000 0.8144 24.0000 5.1161 236.36
1466-5-23
5 0.00 41.667% 139.000 0.7031 27.8000 5.9261 273.79
1467-10-13
4 12.00 37.500% 130.000 0.6766 28.8889 6.1582 284.51
1474-12-10
4 0.00 33.333% 131.000 0.5968 32.7500 6.9813 322.54
1477-9-20
3 12.00 29.167% 131.000 0.5222 37.4286 7.9786 368.61
1482-7
3 3.00 26.042% 131.000 0.4663 41.9200 8.9361 412.85    
Table 1 B.                                       Alterations of the Flemish Silver Coinages:  1384 - 1482                                                           
Date and names 





























Single Groot £ gr
1384 - 07 - 16
Double Groot 2.000 50.00% 0.4792 50.00 4.8951 2.3455 0.8333 0.7167 0.05000 0.06667
Groot 1.000 50.00% 0.4792 100.00 2.4475 1.1728 0.8333 0.7167 0.05000 0.06667
1386-10-29
Double Groot 2.000 50.00% 0.4792 57.00 4.2939 2.0575 0.9500 0.8833 0.01042 0.05625
Groot 1.000 44.44% 0.4259 102.00 2.3995 1.0220 0.9563 0.8833 0.01667 0.05625
1387-04-03
Double Groot 2.000 43.06% 0.4126 59.50 4.1135 1.6973 1.1517 1.0375 0.03507 0.07917
Groot 1.000 43.06% 0.4126 119.00 2.0567 0.8486 1.1517 1.0375 0.03507 0.07917
1388-10-01
Double Groot 2.000 40.28% 0.3860 60.50 4.0455 1.5615 1.2566 1.1000 0.03333 0.12326
Groot 1.000 40.28% 0.3860 121.00 2.0228 0.7808 1.2566 1.1000 0.03333 0.12326
1389 - 12 - 20
Double Groot 2.000 50.00% 0.4792 57.00 4.2939 2.0575 0.9500 0.8500 0.01667 0.08333
Groot 1.000 41.67% 0.3993 96.00 2.5495 1.0180 0.9600 0.8500 0.01667 0.09332
1391 - 01 - 24Date and names 





























Single Groot £ gr
Double Groot 2.000 50.00% 0.4792 57.50 4.2566 2.0396 0.9583 0.8583 0.01667 0.08333
1393 - 08 - 24
Double Groot 2.000 50.00% 0.4792 57.00 4.2939 2.0575 0.9500 0.8750 0.01667 0.05833
Groot 1.000 41.67% 0.3993 96.00 2.5495 1.0180 0.9600 0.8750 0.01667 0.06832
1409 - 08 - 17
Double Groot 2.000 50.00% 0.4792 49.00 4.9950 2.3934 0.8167 0.7583 0.00833 0.05000
Groot 1.000 41.67% 0.3993 82.67 2.9607 1.1822 0.8266 0.7583 0.00833 0.05998
1416 - 12 - 06
Double Groot 2.000 41.67% 0.3993 50.00 4.8951 1.9546 1.0000 0.8625 0.06667 0.07083
Groot 1.000 34.72% 0.3328 85.00 2.8794 0.9581 1.0208 0.8625 0.06667 0.09167
1418 -  06 - 12
Double Groot 2.000 50.00% 0.4792 68.00 3.5993 1.7247 1.1333 1.0583 0.01667 0.05833
Groot 1.000 41.67% 0.3993 115.00 2.1283 0.8498 1.1500 1.0583 0.01667 0.07500
1428 - 11 - 07
Double Groot 2.000 44.44% 0.4259 68.50 3.5730 1.5218 1.2840 1.2000 0.02500 0.05903
Groot 1.000 37.50% 0.3594 117.50 2.0830 0.7486 1.3056 1.2000 0.02917 0.07639
1433 - 10 - 12
Double Groot 2.000 50.00% 0.4792 72.00 3.3993 1.6289 1.2000 1.1375 0.00833 0.05417Date and names 





























Single Groot £ gr
Groot 1.000 50.00% 0.4792 144.00 1.6997 0.8144 1.2000 1.1375 0.00833 0.05417
1466 - 05 - 23
Double Patard 4.000 95.83% 0.9184 79.50 3.0787 2.8274 1.3826 1.3375 0.00625 0.03885
Double Groot or Patard 2.000 50.00% 0.4792 82.50 2.9667 1.4215 1.3750 1.3167 0.00625 0.05208
Groot 1.000 41.67% 0.3993 139.00 1.7608 0.7031 1.3893 1.3167 0.00625 0.06641
1467 - 10 - 13
Double Patard 4.000 91.67% 0.8785 77.50 3.1581 2.7743 1.4091 1.3667 0.00625 0.03617
Double Groot or Patard 2.000 50.00% 0.4792 84.50 2.8965 1.3879 1.4083 1.3500 0.00625 0.05208
Groot 1.000 37.50% 0.3594 130.00 1.8827 0.6766 1.4444 1.3458 0.00625 0.09236
1474 - 10 - 27
Double Patard 4.000 83.33% 0.7986 80.00 3.0594 2.4433 1.6000 1.5333 0.02500 0.04167
Double Groot or Patard 2.000 41.67% 0.3993 80.00 3.0594 1.2216 1.6000 1.5167 0.02500 0.05833
Groot 1.000 33.33% 0.3194 131.00 1.8683 0.5968 1.6375 1.5167 0.02500 0.09583
1477 - 12 - 20
Double Patard 4.500 83.33% 0.7986 80.00 3.0594 2.4433 1.8000 1.7333 0.02500 0.04167
Double Groot or Patard 2.250 41.67% 0.3993 80.00 3.0594 1.2216 1.8000 1.7167 0.02500 0.05833
Groot 1.000 29.17% 0.2795 131.00 1.8683 0.5222 1.8714 1.7167 0.02500 0.12969
1482 - 07 - 18
Double Patard 5.000 83.33% 0.7986 80.00 3.0594 2.4433 2.0000 1.9406 0.01354 0.04583
Double Groot or Patard 2.500 41.67% 0.3993 80.00 3.0594 1.2216 2.0000 1.9198 0.01354 0.06667Date and names 





























Single Groot £ gr
Groot 1.000 26.04% 0.2496 131.00 1.8683 0.4663 2.0958 1.9198 0.01354 0.16250
Date and names 




























1384 - 07 - 16
Double Groot 0.1167 0.8333 6.00% 8.00% 86.00%
Groot 0.1167 0.8333 6.00% 8.00% 86.00%
1386-10-29
Double Groot 0.0667 0.9500 1.10% 5.92% 92.98% -12.28% 14.00%
Groot 0.0729 0.9563 1.74% 5.88% 92.37% -12.85% 14.75%
1387-04-03
Double Groot 0.1142 1.1517 3.04% 6.87% 90.08% -17.51% 21.24%
Groot 0.1142 1.1517 3.04% 6.87% 90.08% -16.96% 20.44%
1388-10-01
Double Groot 0.1566 1.2566 2.65% 9.81% 87.54% -8.00% 9.10%
Groot 0.1566 1.2566 2.65% 9.81% 87.54% -8.00% 9.10%Date and names 




























1389 - 12 - 20
Double Groot 0.1000 0.9500 1.75% 8.77% 89.47% 31.76% -24.40%
Groot 0.1100 0.9600 1.74% 9.72% 88.54% 30.39% -23.60%
1391 - 01 - 24
Double Groot 0.1000 0.9583 1.74% 8.70% 89.57% -0.87% 0.88%
Groot 0.1100 0.9600 1.74% 9.72% 88.54% 0.00% 0.00%
1393 - 08 - 24
Double Groot 0.0750 0.9500 1.75% 6.14% 92.11% 0.88% -0.87%
Groot 0.0850 0.9600 1.74% 7.12% 91.15% 0.00% 0.00%
1409 - 08 - 17
Double Groot 0.0583 0.8167 1.02% 6.12% 92.86% 16.33% -14.04%
Groot 0.0683 0.8266 1.01% 7.26% 91.74% 16.13% -13.89%
1416 - 12 - 06
Double Groot 0.1375 1.0000 6.67% 7.08% 86.25% -18.33% 22.45%
Groot 0.1583 1.0208 6.53% 8.98% 84.49% -18.95% 23.49%
1418 -  06 - 12
Double Groot 0.0750 1.1333 1.47% 5.15% 93.38% -11.76% 13.33%
Groot 0.0917 1.1500 1.45% 6.52% 92.03% -11.30% 12.65%Date and names 




























1428 - 11 - 07
Double Groot 0.0840 1.2840 1.95% 4.60% 93.46% -11.76% 13.30%
Groot 0.1056 1.3056 2.23% 5.85% 91.91% -11.91% 13.53%
1433 - 10 - 12
Double Groot 0.0625 1.2000 0.69% 4.51% 94.79% 7.03% -6.54%
Groot 0.0625 1.2000 0.69% 4.51% 94.79% 8.80% -8.09%
1466 - 05 - 23
Double Patard 0.0451 1.3826 0.45% 2.81% 96.74%
Double Groot or
Patard
0.0583 1.3750 0.45% 3.79% 95.76% -12.73% 14.58%
Groot 0.0727 1.3893 0.45% 4.78% 94.77% -13.67% 15.78%
1467 - 10 - 13
Double Patard 0.0424 1.4091 0.44% 2.57% 96.99% -1.88% 1.92%
Double Groot or
Patard
0.0583 1.4083 0.44% 3.70% 95.86% -2.37% 2.42%
Groot 0.0986 1.4444 0.43% 6.39% 93.17% -3.77% 3.97%
1474 - 10 - 27
Double Patard 0.0667 1.6000 1.56% 2.60% 95.83% -11.93% 13.55%
Double Groot or
Patard
0.0833 1.6000 1.56% 3.65% 94.79% -11.98% 13.61%
Groot 0.1208 1.6375 1.53% 5.85% 92.62% -11.79% 13.37%Date and names 




























1477 - 12 - 20
Double Patard 0.0667 1.8000 1.39% 2.31% 96.30% 0.00% 12.50%
Double Groot or
Patard
0.0833 1.8000 1.39% 3.24% 95.37% 0.00% 12.50%
Groot 0.1547 1.8714 1.34% 6.93% 91.73% -12.50% 14.28%
1482 - 07 - 18
Double Patard 0.0594 2.0000 0.68% 2.29% 97.03% 0.00% 11.11%
Double Groot or
Patard
0.0802 2.0000 0.68% 3.33% 95.99% 0.00% 11.11%
Groot 0.1760 2.0958 0.65% 7.75% 91.60% -10.71% 12.00%Table 2. Outputs of the Mints in Flanders and the Burgundian Low Countries                                                                              
         
in  Kilograms of Fine Metal, Silver and Gold, and in Flemish Pounds Groot                                                                   
                            
in quinquennial means, 1351-55 to 1496-1500                                                                                                                  
Year SILVER SILVER SILVER SILVER GOLD GOLD GOLD GOLD Low Per Per
Flanders Flanders Total LC Total LC Flanders Flanders Total LC Total LC Countries Cent Cent
kg. £ groot kg      £ groot kg    £ groot kg     £ groot £ groot silver gold
1351-55 5,178.951 11,397.252 5,178.951 11,397.252 1,096.661 24,811.554 1,096.661 24,811.554 36,208.806 31.48% 68.52%
1356-60 8,820.730 21,251.516 8,820.730 21,251.516 3,191.827 80,870.028 3,191.827 80,870.028 102,121.544 20.81% 79.19%
1361-65 3,992.165 11,141.966 3,992.165 11,141.966 2,629.891 77,350.494 2,629.891 77,350.494 88,492.460 12.59% 87.41%
1366-70 10,347.518 33,290.674 10,347.518 33,290.674 1,636.694 51,788.717 1,636.694 51,788.717 85,079.391 39.13% 60.87%
1371-75 4,852.022 18,208.349 4,852.022 18,208.349 1,807.028 72,090.390 1,807.028 72,090.390 90,298.739 20.16% 79.84%
1376-80 1,898.960 7,567.387 1,898.960 7,567.387 541.721 21,890.920 541.721 21,890.920 29,458.308 25.69% 74.31%
1381-85 2,816.883 11,467.496 2,816.883 11,467.496 529.809 22,941.630 529.809 22,941.630 34,409.126 33.33% 66.67%
1386-90 2,013.492 8,723.712 2,013.492 8,723.712 465.426 22,891.085 465.426 22,891.085 31,614.797 27.59% 72.41%
1391-95 3,676.062 14,958.400 3,676.062 14,958.400 368.614 14,458.242 368.614 14,458.242 29,416.642 50.85% 49.15%
1396-1400 5,791.306 23,507.520 5,791.306 23,507.520 324.589 12,731.424 324.589 12,731.424 36,238.944 64.87% 35.13%
1401-05 691.661 2,826.540 691.661 2,826.540 31.535 1,236.902 31.535 1,236.902 4,063.442 69.56% 30.44%
1406-10 1,113.700 3,887.994 1,113.700 3,887.994 19.025 636.250 19.025 636.250 4,524.244 85.94% 14.06%
1411-15 2,484.269 8,665.846 2,484.269 8,665.846 5.884 196.762 5.884 196.762 8,862.608 97.78% 2.22%Year SILVER SILVER SILVER SILVER GOLD GOLD GOLD GOLD Low Per Per
Flanders Flanders Total LC Total LC Flanders Flanders Total LC Total LC Countries Cent Cent
kg. £ groot kg      £ groot kg    £ groot kg     £ groot £ groot silver gold
1416-20 2,828.980 13,624.106 3,124.468 15,052.698 2.278 85.550 4.308 181.634 15,234.332 98.81% 1.19%
1421-25 11,427.611 55,349.868 12,143.547 57,614.792 36.533 1,949.216 41.056 2,195.696 59,810.488 96.33% 3.67%
1426-30 5,724.635 30,932.966 7,999.913 43,326.036 372.372 22,373.694 1,105.072 69,470.308 112,796.344 38.41% 61.59%
1431-35 4,568.739 23,495.926 6,609.816 34,252.100 313.963 17,491.002 1,774.868 115,363.244 149,615.344 22.89% 77.11%
1436-40 3,505.132 17,981.664 5,015.219 25,788.306 241.904 13,483.328 511.935 28,534.390 54,322.696 47.47% 52.53%
1441-45 102.683 527.552 102.683 527.552 111.931 6,466.290 111.931 6,466.290 6,993.842 7.54% 92.46%
1446-50 5.911 40.786 5.911 40.786 2.550 148.084 2.550 148.084 188.870 21.59% 78.41%
1451-55 53.164 283.980 164.611 880.316 322.409 19,759.234 827.293 50,701.692 51,582.008 1.71% 98.29%
1456-60 51.302 336.654 64.066 408.310 160.791 9,854.308 253.139 15,513.918 15,922.228 2.56% 97.44%
1461-65 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 6.596 404.224 6.596 404.224 404.224 0.00% 100.00%
1466-70 2,975.690 17,957.102 4,628.964 27,867.694 186.880 12,116.676 253.594 16,400.726 44,268.420 62.95% 37.05%
1471-75 4,619.347 28,258.168 7,313.984 45,191.724 140.215 10,042.534 261.202 18,927.514 64,119.238 70.48% 29.52%
1476-80 4,078.520 28,866.250 9,341.495 67,636.248 186.598 14,335.372 380.051 29,208.498 96,844.746 69.84% 30.16%
1481-85 1,997.516 16,669.166 6,534.304 56,337.178 27.255 2,470.546 58.536 5,216.392 61,553.570 91.53% 8.47%
1486-90 940.931 9,235.614 6,803.602 78,323.898 0.000 0.000 144.641 24,136.964 102,460.862 76.44% 23.56%
1491-95 1,039.270 7,332.372 2,780.071 19,521.098 9.272 623.804 20.320 1,336.340 20,857.438 93.59% 6.41%Year SILVER SILVER SILVER SILVER GOLD GOLD GOLD GOLD Low Per Per
Flanders Flanders Total LC Total LC Flanders Flanders Total LC Total LC Countries Cent Cent
kg. £ groot kg      £ groot kg    £ groot kg     £ groot £ groot silver gold
1496-1500 2,071.913 17,066.911 5,345.911 44,764.905 293.421 27,548.326 474.633 44,464.280 89,229.185 50.17% 49.83%Table 3                Basket of Consumables Price Index for  Flanders (Bruges and Ghent)
In quinquennial means: 1351-55 to 1496-1500
Mean of 1451-75 = 100 = 126.295 d groot Flemish
values in d. groot Flemish
Year Basket Commodity Grains Dairy Textiles Grains Dairy Textiles
Consumables Basket  Group Group Group as per as per as per
Total Value Index Index Index Index cent of cent of cent of
in d 1451-75= 1451-75= 1451-75= 1451-75= total total total
groot 100 100 100 100 basket basket basket
Flemish 126.295 56.354 44.665 25.276 by value by value by value
gr Flemish gr Flemish gr Flemish gr Flemish
1351-55 76.593 60.646 68.466 63.048 38.968 50.37% 36.77% 12.86%
1356-60 110.558 87.540 102.100 93.151 45.160 52.04% 37.63% 10.32%
1361-65 119.255 94.425 108.636 98.228 56.023 51.34% 36.79% 11.87%
1366-70 135.641 107.401 126.994 101.825 73.568 52.76% 33.53% 13.71%
1371-75 145.519 115.222 121.901 112.359 105.388 47.21% 34.49% 18.31%
1376-80 141.024 111.662 105.597 121.366 108.038 42.20% 38.44% 19.36%
1381-85 150.534 119.193 110.799 135.714 108.711 41.48% 40.27% 18.25%
1386-90 157.514 124.719 132.745 122.655 110.470 47.49% 34.78% 17.73%
1391-95 111.784 88.510 82.803 99.235 82.282 41.74% 39.65% 18.60%
1396-00 113.407 89.796 92.733 92.132 79.118 46.08% 36.29% 17.63%
1401-05 111.810 88.531 95.190 80.675 87.565 47.98% 32.23% 19.79%Year Basket Commodity Grains Dairy Textiles Grains Dairy Textiles
Consumables Basket  Group Group Group as per as per as per
Total Value Index Index Index Index cent of cent of cent of
in d 1451-75= 1451-75= 1451-75= 1451-75= total total total
groot 100 100 100 100 basket basket basket
Flemish 126.295 56.354 44.665 25.276 by value by value by value
gr Flemish gr Flemish gr Flemish gr Flemish
1406-10 132.939 105.261 115.682 91.056 107.127 49.04% 30.59% 20.37%
1411-15 120.370 95.309 93.652 92.417 104.114 43.84% 34.29% 21.86%
1416-20 135.616 107.381 110.755 104.677 104.636 46.02% 34.48% 19.50%
1421-25 141.680 112.182 112.756 114.392 106.998 44.85% 36.06% 19.09%
1426-30 148.741 117.773 122.830 114.511 112.262 46.54% 34.39% 19.08%
1431-35 155.989 123.512 132.917 115.130 117.353 48.02% 32.97% 19.02%
1436-40 177.022 140.166 172.289 109.153 123.350 54.85% 27.54% 17.61%
1441-45 143.350 113.504 111.205 113.067 119.403 43.72% 35.23% 21.05%
1446-50 138.904 109.984 107.703 110.051 114.952 43.70% 35.39% 20.92%
1451-55 127.434 100.902 95.302 102.660 110.282 42.14% 35.98% 21.87%
1456-60 148.845 117.855 131.873 107.281 105.288 49.93% 32.19% 17.88%
1461-65 112.030 88.705 83.052 90.737 97.721 41.78% 36.18% 22.05%
1466-70 121.900 96.520 93.351 101.206 95.304 43.16% 37.08% 19.76%
1471-75 121.264 96.017 96.422 98.116 91.406 44.81% 36.14% 19.05%
1476-80 148.034 117.213 125.644 118.347 96.410 47.83% 35.71% 16.46%Year Basket Commodity Grains Dairy Textiles Grains Dairy Textiles
Consumables Basket  Group Group Group as per as per as per
Total Value Index Index Index Index cent of cent of cent of
in d 1451-75= 1451-75= 1451-75= 1451-75= total total total
groot 100 100 100 100 basket basket basket
Flemish 126.295 56.354 44.665 25.276 by value by value by value
gr Flemish gr Flemish gr Flemish gr Flemish
1481-85 198.097 156.853 198.728 131.927 107.537 56.53% 29.75% 13.72%
1486-90 233.028 184.511 190.773 187.098 165.979 46.14% 35.86% 18.00%
1491-95 183.104 144.981 156.841 122.174 158.841 48.27% 29.80% 21.93%
1496-00 126.617 100.255 82.119 93.309 152.966 36.55% 32.92% 30.54%
BASKET OF CONSUMABLES COMMODITY PRICE INDEXES                                                                                    
                                 
Commodity FLANDERS
Amount Unit Value in Percent
Farinaceous in d  gr.
Flemish
Wheat 45.461 l. 13.279 10.51%
Rye 36.369 l. 7.062 5.59%
Barley 18.184 l. 2.867 2.27%
Peas 24.243 l. 7.341 5.81%
Sub-total 124.257 l. 30.549 24.19%Commodity FLANDERS
Amount Unit Value in Percent
Farinaceous in d  gr.
Flemish
Drink
barley (or malt) 163.659 l. 25.805 20.43%
Total Farinaceous 287.917 l. 56.354 44.62%
Meat, Fish, Dairy
Butter 13.610 kg 36.087 28.57%
Cheese 13.610 kg 8.578 6.79%
Sub-total 27.220 44.665 35.37%
Industrial
Coarse Woollens 1.225 m. 25.276 20.01%
Sub-total 25.276 20.01%
TOTAL 126.295 100.00%Table 4 Flemish Silver Coinage Changes and Price Changes, 1380-1482                                                         
Relationship between coinage debasement and the money of account value of a kilogram                                           
of pure silver, in coin                                                                                                               
    Δ   T (traite) = [1/(1 - x)] - 1         x = percentage change in silver contents of 1d groot                                                          
                                                                                                       
Flemish Price Index:  Mean of 1451-1475 = 100 = 126.295 d groot Flemish                                                                          
                        
Date Year Silver % Traite Value of  % Value of Flemish %
of 1 Jan - grams change of Silver 1 kg Pure change Flemish Price change
coinage 31 Dec in 1d in Marc AR Silver in in  Basket Index
change groot silver in shillings £ groot value in d groot from 1350
groot 1 d groot Flemish
1380-1-30 1380 1.0110 -9.28% 19.333 4.121 10.23% 134.373 106.396 -0.46%
1381 1.0110 0.00% 19.333 4.121 0.00% 133.718 105.878 -0.49%
1382 1.0110 0.00% 19.333 4.121 0.00% 145.040 114.843 8.47%
1383-9-12 1383 0.9689 -4.17% 20.174 4.300 4.35% 143.218 113.400 -1.26%
1384-9-10 1384 1.1728 21.04% 16.667 3.553 -17.39% 154.314 122.185 7.75%
1385 1.1728 0.00% 16.667 3.553 0.00% 176.381 139.658 14.30%
1386-4-18 1386 1.0220 -12.85% 19.125 4.077 14.75% 167.336 132.496 -5.13%
1386-10-29 1386 1.0061 -1.56% 19.429 4.142 1.59% 167.336 132.496 0.00%
1387-4-3 1387 0.8486 -15.65% 23.032 4.910 18.55% 169.142 133.926 1.08%
1388-10-1 1388 0.7808 -8.00% 25.035 5.337 8.69% 132.960 105.278 -21.39%
1389-12-20 1389 1.0180 30.39% 19.200 4.093 -23.31% 153.323 121.401 15.32%
1390 1.0180 0.00% 19.200 4.093 0.00% 164.806 130.493 7.49%
1391-1-24 1391 1.0075 -1.03% 19.400 4.135 1.04% 134.037 106.130 -18.67%
1392 1.0075 0.00% 19.400 4.135 0.00% 113.614 89.959 -15.24%
1393-6-20 1393 1.0180 1.04% 19.200 4.093 -1.03% 99.657 78.908 -12.28%
1394 1.0180 0.00% 19.200 4.093 0.00% 110.844 87.766 11.23%Date Year Silver % Traite Value of  % Value of Flemish %
of 1 Jan - grams change of Silver 1 kg Pure change Flemish Price change
coinage 31 Dec in 1d in Marc AR Silver in in  Basket Index
change groot silver in shillings £ groot value in d groot from 1350
groot 1 d groot Flemish
1395 1.0180 0.00% 19.200 4.093 0.00% 100.768 79.788 -9.09%
1396 1.0180 0.00% 19.200 4.093 0.00% 105.820 83.788 5.01%
1397 1.0180 0.00% 19.200 4.093 0.00% 128.543 101.780 21.47%
1398 1.0180 0.00% 19.200 4.093 0.00% 117.823 93.292 -8.34%
1399 1.0180 0.00% 19.200 4.093 0.00% 104.026 82.368 -11.71%
1400 1.0180 0.00% 19.200 4.093 0.00% 110.824 87.751 6.54%
1401 1.0180 0.00% 19.200 4.093 0.00% 113.341 89.743 2.27%
1402 1.0180 0.00% 19.200 4.093 0.00% 116.456 92.209 2.75%
1403 1.0180 0.00% 19.200 4.093 0.00% 122.507 97.001 5.20%
1404 1.0180 0.00% 19.200 4.093 0.00% 102.946 81.512 -15.97%
1405 1.0180 0.00% 19.200 4.093 0.00% 103.799 82.188 0.83%
1406 1.0180 0.00% 19.200 4.093 0.00% 105.226 83.318 1.37%
1407-4-30 1407 1.1043 8.47% 19.200 4.093 0.00% 124.277 98.402 18.10%
1407-7-7 1407 1.0180 -7.81% 19.200 4.093 0.00% 124.277 98.402 0.00%
1409-8-17 1408 1.1822 16.13% 16.533 3.524 -13.89% 133.170 105.444 7.16%
1409 1.1822 0.00% 16.533 3.524 0.00% 166.534 131.861 25.05%
1410 1.1822 0.00% 16.533 3.524 0.00% 135.488 107.279 -18.64%
1411 1.1822 0.00% 16.533 3.524 0.00% 100.492 79.569 -25.83%
1412 1.1822 0.00% 16.533 3.524 0.00% 114.743 90.853 14.18%
1413 1.1822 0.00% 16.533 3.524 0.00% 126.848 100.438 10.55%
1414 1.1822 0.00% 16.533 3.524 0.00% 124.889 98.887 -1.54%
1415 1.1822 0.00% 16.533 3.524 0.00% 134.880 106.798 8.00%
1416-12-6 1416 0.9581 -18.95% 20.400 4.349 23.39% 150.185 118.916 11.35%
1417 0.9581 0.00% 20.400 4.349 0.00% 168.555 133.461 12.23%
1418-6-12 1418 0.8498 -11.30% 23.000 4.903 12.75% 116.493 92.239 -30.89%
1419 0.8498 0.00% 23.000 4.903 0.00% 118.932 94.170 2.09%
1420 0.8498 0.00% 23.000 4.903 0.00% 123.917 98.118 4.19%
1421 0.8498 0.00% 23.000 4.903 0.00% 135.816 107.538 9.60%
1422 0.8498 0.00% 23.000 4.903 0.00% 141.966 112.408 4.53%Date Year Silver % Traite Value of  % Value of Flemish %
of 1 Jan - grams change of Silver 1 kg Pure change Flemish Price change
coinage 31 Dec in 1d in Marc AR Silver in in  Basket Index
change groot silver in shillings £ groot value in d groot from 1350
groot 1 d groot Flemish
1423 0.8498 0.00% 23.000 4.903 0.00% 130.379 103.234 -8.16%
1424 0.8498 0.00% 23.000 4.903 0.00% 149.826 118.632 14.92%
1425 0.8498 0.00% 23.000 4.903 0.00% 150.416 119.099 0.39%
1426 0.8498 0.00% 23.000 4.903 0.00% 135.544 107.323 -9.89%
1427 0.8498 0.00% 23.000 4.903 0.00% 146.895 116.311 8.37%
1428-11-7 1428 0.7486 -11.91% 26.111 5.566 13.53% 141.851 112.317 -3.43%
1429 0.7486 0.00% 26.111 5.566 0.00% 160.475 127.064 13.13%
1430 0.7486 0.00% 26.111 5.566 0.00% 158.941 125.849 -0.96%
1431 0.7486 0.00% 26.111 5.566 0.00% 155.796 123.359 -1.98%
1432 0.7486 0.00% 26.111 5.566 0.00% 147.576 116.851 -5.28%
1433-10-12 1433 0.8144 8.80% 24.000 5.116 -8.09% 175.816 139.210 19.14%
1434 0.8144 0.00% 24.000 5.116 0.00% 164.300 130.092 -6.55%
1435 0.8144 0.00% 24.000 5.116 0.00% 136.456 108.046 -16.95%
1436 0.8144 0.00% 24.000 5.116 0.00% 122.225 96.777 -10.43%
1437 0.8144 0.00% 24.000 5.116 0.00% 140.259 111.057 14.76%
1438 0.8144 0.00% 24.000 5.116 0.00% 234.974 186.052 67.53%
1439 0.8144 0.00% 24.000 5.116 0.00% 241.337 191.090 2.71%
1440 0.8144 0.00% 24.000 5.116 0.00% 146.317 115.854 -39.37%
1441 0.8144 0.00% 24.000 5.116 0.00% 156.040 123.552 6.65%
1442 0.8144 0.00% 24.000 5.116 0.00% 136.240 107.875 -12.69%
1443 0.8144 0.00% 24.000 5.116 0.00% 178.214 141.109 30.81%
1444 0.8144 0.00% 24.000 5.116 0.00% 126.467 100.136 -29.04%
1445 0.8144 0.00% 24.000 5.116 0.00% 119.790 94.850 -5.28%
1446 0.8144 0.00% 24.000 5.116 0.00% 144.775 114.632 20.86%
1447 0.8144 0.00% 24.000 5.116 0.00% 160.241 126.879 10.68%
1448 0.8144 0.00% 24.000 5.116 0.00% 142.056 112.479 -11.35%
1449 0.8144 0.00% 24.000 5.116 0.00% 118.072 93.490 -16.88%
1450 0.8144 0.00% 24.000 5.116 0.00% 129.378 102.441 9.57%
1451 0.8144 0.00% 24.000 5.116 0.00% 124.475 98.559 -3.79%Date Year Silver % Traite Value of  % Value of Flemish %
of 1 Jan - grams change of Silver 1 kg Pure change Flemish Price change
coinage 31 Dec in 1d in Marc AR Silver in in  Basket Index
change groot silver in shillings £ groot value in d groot from 1350
groot 1 d groot Flemish
1452 0.8144 0.00% 24.000 5.116 0.00% 121.500 96.203 -2.39%
1453 0.8144 0.00% 24.000 5.116 0.00% 136.156 107.808 12.06%
1454 0.8144 0.00% 24.000 5.116 0.00% 133.161 105.437 -2.20%
1455 0.8144 0.00% 24.000 5.116 0.00% 121.880 96.505 -8.47%
1456 0.8144 0.00% 24.000 5.116 0.00% 149.444 118.330 22.62%
1457 0.8144 0.00% 24.000 5.116 0.00% 164.206 130.018 9.88%
1458 0.8144 0.00% 24.000 5.116 0.00% 150.723 119.342 -8.21%
1459 0.8144 0.00% 24.000 5.116 0.00% 132.542 104.947 -12.06%
1460 0.8144 0.00% 24.000 5.116 0.00% 147.310 116.640 11.14%
1461 0.8144 0.00% 24.000 5.116 0.00% 125.656 99.494 -14.70%
1462 0.8144 0.00% 24.000 5.116 0.00% 121.121 95.903 -3.61%
1463 0.8144 0.00% 24.000 5.116 0.00% 103.168 81.688 -14.82%
1464 0.8144 0.00% 24.000 5.116 0.00% 98.413 77.923 -4.61%
1466-5-23 1465 0.7031 -13.67% 27.800 5.926 15.83% 111.793 88.518 13.60%
1466 0.7031 0.00% 27.800 5.926 0.00% 121.154 95.930 8.37%
1467-10-13 1467 0.6766 -3.77% 32.750 6.158 3.92% 129.006 102.146 6.48%
1468 0.6766 0.00% 37.429 6.158 0.00% 121.436 96.153 -5.87%
1469 0.6766 0.00% 37.429 6.158 0.00% 121.243 96.000 -0.16%
1470 0.6766 0.00% 37.429 6.158 0.00% 116.661 92.372 -3.78%
1471 0.6766 0.00% 37.429 6.158 0.00% 125.794 99.604 7.83%
1472 0.6766 0.00% 37.429 6.158 0.00% 120.760 95.617 -4.00%
1473 0.6766 0.00% 37.429 6.158 0.00% 104.770 82.957 -13.24%
1474 0.6766 0.00% 37.429 6.158 0.00% 136.661 108.208 30.44%
1474-12-10 1475 0.5968 -11.79% 32.750 6.981 13.37% 118.337 93.699 -13.41%
1476 0.5968 0.00% 32.750 6.981 0.00% 116.659 92.370 -1.42%
1477-9-20 1477 0.5222 -12.50% 37.429 7.979 14.29% 124.747 98.775 6.93%
1478 0.5222 0.00% 37.429 7.979 0.00% 164.072 129.911 31.52%
1479 0.5222 0.00% 37.429 7.979 0.00% 188.593 149.327 14.95%
1480 0.5222 0.00% 37.429 7.979 0.00% 146.097 115.679 -22.53%Date Year Silver % Traite Value of  % Value of Flemish %
of 1 Jan - grams change of Silver 1 kg Pure change Flemish Price change
coinage 31 Dec in 1d in Marc AR Silver in in  Basket Index
change groot silver in shillings £ groot value in d groot from 1350
groot 1 d groot Flemish
1481 0.5222 0.00% 37.429 7.979 0.00% 174.173 137.910 19.22%
1482-7 1482 0.4663 -10.71% 41.920 8.936 12.00% 244.926 193.932 40.62%Table 5. Flemish Coinage Debasement: The Flemish Mint Ordinances of June 1418 and November 1428
Double Groot (Gros) June 1418 November 1428
Value in money-of-account 
a 2d groot [or gros Flemish] 2d groot [or gros Flemish]
Fineness 
b 6 deniers AR     =  50.0% fine 5 deniers 8 grains AR =  44.44% fine 
in argent-le-roy (AR) = 47.92% pure        =  42.59% pure
Weight (Taille) 
c in grams 68 cut to the marc   3.599 grams 68.5 cut to the marc   = 3.573 grams
    Fine silver content AR in g. 1.800 g. 1.588 g.
    Pure silver content in g.  1.725 g. 1.522 g.
Traite per marc 
d 68.0 x 2d. = 136d      = 22s 8d 68.5 x 2d. = 137d     = 25s 8d 6 mites
  argent-le-roy    6/12          0.5 5.333/12       0.444
....................................
Division of the Traite Value Value in  Number Percentage Value in Number of Percentage
per marc argent-le-roy groot Flemish of coins of the traite groot Flemish coins of the traite
Brassage  1s 2d   7   5.15%  1s 2d 6m   7 1/8   4.62%
Seigniorage      4d     2    1.47%       6d 0m      3        1.95%
Total Mint Charges (of the above)  1s 6d   9   6.62%  1s 8d 6m  10 1/8   6.57%
Mint Price: for merchants’ bullion 21s 2d 127  93.38% 24s 0d 0m 144  93.43%
Traite per Marc argent-le-roy 22s 8d 136 100.00% 25s 8d 6m 154 1/8 100.00%
............................
a Values in money-of-account:  1 penny or 1d groot = 24 mites = 12d or 1s parisis
12d groot = 1s (sou, sol, schelling); 1 livre or pond (£1 pound) = 20 shillings  = 240d (pence)
b Fineness:  reckoned out of 12 deniers argent-le-roy, with 24 grains per denier: 23/24 or 95.833% pure
c Weight:  reckoned in terms of the taille or number cut from the marc de Troyes of 8 onces: 244.753 g. 
d Traite per marc:  official value of coinage struck per marc argent le roy: T = taille *  face value/fineness 
fineness: (Fineness/12 deniers Argent-le-Roy)Table 6.                                    The Flemish Silver Coinage Debasement of Nov 1428 and its Aftermath                                      
                                             
Year Mint Outputs
in Marcs   






Output in  £ 
groot     





Flemish   
Percentage
Change   
  le roy *          
1428 4,598.700 1,078.647 5,267.280 123
1429 72,460.700 16,996.010 1475.68% 93,021.380 1666.02% 2,035 1554.47%
1430 34,992.400 8,207.638 -51.71% 45,065.400 -51.55% 1,316 -35.33%
1431 5,595.200 1,312.381 -84.01% 7,240.240 -83.93% 283 -78.50%
1432 104.300 24.464 -98.14% 135.140 -98.13% 55 -80.57%
* Marc argent-le-roy = 244.7529 grams commercially fine silver, at 23/24 or 95.833% purity, with 4.167% copper.Sources for the Tables and Figures:
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C.  Prices and the Flemish Price Index (Table 3.
Stadsarchief Gent, Stadsrekeningen, 1350-51 to 1499-1500: cloth prices from the Ghent town accounts.Charles Verlinden, E. Scholliers, et al, eds., Documents pour l'histoire des prix et des salaires en Flandre et en Brabant/Dokumenten voor de
geschiedenis van prijzen en lonen in Vlaanderen en Brabant, 4 vols. (Bruges, 1959 - 65)
John Munro, ‘Wage-Stickiness, Monetary Changes, and Real Incomes in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries, 1300 - 1500:  Did
Money Matter?’ Research in Economic History, 21 (2003), 185 - 297.
John Munro, ‘Builders’ Wages in Southern England and the Southern Low Countries, 1346 -1500:  A Comparative Study of Trends in and Levels
of Real Incomes’, in Simonetta Cavaciocchi, ed., L’Edilizia prima della rivoluzione industriale, secc. XIII-XVIII, Atti delle “Settimana di Studi” e
altri convegni, no. 36, Istituto Internazionale di Storia Economica  “Francesco Datini” (Florence: Le Monnier, 2005), pp. 1013-76.
D.  Prices and the English Price Index (graphs)
E. H. Phelps Brown and Sheila V. Hopkins, ‘Seven Centuries of the Prices of Consumables, Compared with Builders’ Wage Rates’, Economica,
23:92 (November 1956), 296-314: reprinted in E.M. Carus-Wilson, ed., Essays in Economic History, 3 vols. (London, 1954-62), II, 168-78, 179-
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in five-year means, from 1346-50 to 1496-1550:   expressed in constant pounds sterling 
of England, as a measure of real outputs 
 
Values of a kilogram of English fine gold and of English fine silver: unchanged from 
1351 to 1411 
 
 Figure 3: 
 
The values of the gold and silver coinage outputs of Flanders and of the other Burgundian 
Low Countries, in five-year means, from 1336-40 to 1496-1500: in current pounds groot 
Flemish 
 




The values of the gold and silver coinage outputs of Flanders and the other Burgundian 
Low Countries, compared with the Flemish Composite Price Index, in five-year means, 
from 1346-50 to 1496-1500. 
 




Flemish commodity prices and the Flemish composite price index, from 1346-50 to 
1496-1500, in five year-means 
 
100 = means values of 1451-75 
 
Farinaceous price index:  composite of wheat, rye, oats, barley, and malt prices 
 
Dairy products index: composite of butter and cheese prices 
 
Industrial: composite of wool-based textile prices 